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Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice
Most talk about the law of criminal procedure treats that law as a self-
contained universe. The picture looks something like this: The Supreme Court
says that suspects and defendants have a right to be free from certain types of
police or prosecutorial behavior. Police and prosecutors, for the most part, then
do as they're told. When they don't, and when the misconduct is tied to
criminal convictions, the courts reverse the convictions, thereby sending a
message to misbehaving officials. Within the bounds of this picture there is
room for a lot of debate about the wisdom or constitutional pedigree of
particular doctrines, and the literature is filled with debate of that sort." There
is also room for theorizing about the optimal specificity of the rules the
Supreme Court creates; the literature contains some of that, though less than
it should.2 Finally, there is room for arguing about remedies-about whether
reversing criminal convictions is an appropriate means of getting the police,
prosecutors, and trial judges to do what the law says they ought to do. At least
in the sphere of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, a lively debate along those
lines exists.3 But for all their variety, these debates take for granted the same
basic picture of the process, a process whose only variables are the rules
themselves and the remedies for their violation.
The picture is, of course, wrong. Criminal procedure's rules and remedies
are embedded in a larger system, a system that can adjust to those rules in
ways other than obeying them. And the rules can in turn respond to the system
1. Until recently, the literature has been more concerned with the law's wisdom, with whether the rules
made sense, than with its constitutional pedigree. That seems to have changed The past few )ears have
seen an outpouring of work on the origins and historical development of Fourth. Fifth. and Sixth
Amendment doctrine, so much so that history is becoming the dominant subject matter n criminal
procedure scholarship. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIM NAL PROCaDuRE FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997); R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST S..-INCRML INATION ITS ORIGL'qS
AND DEVELOPMENT (1997); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amnendment During the Lochner Era- Prnaci,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN L REV 555 (1996). Tracey Maclin. Te Central
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 W14. & MARY L REV 197 (1993). William I Stuntz. The
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.3 393 (1995); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through
History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV 1707 (1996) (book review)
2. The best work remains a pair of classic articles from over two decades ago Anthony G
Amsterdam, Perspectives on tre Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L REV 349 (1974). and Wayne R LaFave.
"Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures" Tie Robinson Dlelnuna. 1974 Sup CT
REV. 127.
3. The full literature on the exclusionary rule is much too large to cite In the past few years. that
literature has focused on the merits of a series of arguments. mostly but not entirely htstoncal. advanced
by Akhil Amar, who is currently the exclusionary rule's leading critic For Amar's work on the subject.
see Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privac) Violations). 20 HARV
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar & Renc B Lettow. Fifth Amembnent First Principles
Vie Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 857 (1995). and Akhil Reed Amar. Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994). For responses. see Donald A Dnppts. Akiul Artar on
Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down Vhat Wrong Road Again." 74 N C L REV
1559 (1996); Yale Kamisar, On tire "Fruits" of Miranda Violations. Coerced Confessions. and Compelled
Testimony, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 929 (1995); Tracey Machn. When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is
Worse T7han the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); and Carol S Steiker. Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). For a more ambivalent discussion of the merits of the
exclusionary rule, see William J. Stuntz, ie Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule. 20 HARV J L
& PUB. POL'Y 443 (1997).
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in a variety of ways, not all of them pleasant. The more one focuses on that
dynamic, the more problematic the law of criminal procedure seems.
The heart of the problem is the system's structure. The criminal justice
system is dominated by a trio of forces: crime rates, the definition of crime
(which of course partly determines crime rates), and funding decisions-how
much money to spend on police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and
prisons. These forces determine the ratio of crimes to prosecutors and the ratio
of prosecutions to public defenders, and those ratios in turn go far toward
determining what the system does and how the system does it. But the law that
defines what the criminal process looks like, the law that defines defendants'
rights, is made by judges and Justices who have little information about crime
rates and funding decisions, and whose incentives to take account of those
factors may be perverse. High crime rates make it easy for prosecutors to
substitute cases without strong procedural claims for cases with such claims.
Underfunding of criminal defense counsel limits the number of procedural
claims that can be pressed. Both phenomena make criminal procedure doctrines
seem inexpensive to the appellate judges who define those doctrines.
Unsurprisingly, given that regulating the criminal justice system has seemed
cheap, the courts have done a lot of regulating-more, one suspects, than they
would have done in a world where defendants could afford to litigate more
often and more aggressively, or where prosecutors could not so easily
substitute some cases for others. Criminal procedure is thus distorted by forces
its authors probably do not understand.
The distortion runs both ways. As courts have raised the cost of criminal
investigation and prosecution, legislatures have sought out devices to reduce
those costs. Severe limits on defense funding are the most obvious example,
but not the only one. Expanded criminal liability makes it easier for the
government to induce guilty pleas, as do high mandatory sentences that serve
as useful threats against recalcitrant defendants. And guilty pleas avoid most
of the potentially costly requirements that criminal procedure imposes. These
strategies would no doubt be politically attractive anyway, but the law of
criminal procedure makes them more so. Predictably, underfunding,
overcriminalization, and oversentencing have increased as criminal procedure
has expanded.
Nor are the law's perverse effects limited to courts and legislatures.
Constitutional criminal procedure raises the cost of prosecuting wealthier
defendants by giving those defendants more issues to litigate. The result, at the
margin, is to steer prosecutors away from such defendants and toward poorer
ones. By giving defendants other, cheaper claims to raise, constitutional
criminal procedure also raises the cost to defense counsel of investigating and
litigating factual claims, claims that bear directly on their clients' innocence
or guilt. The result is to steer defense counsel, again at the margin, away from
those sorts of claims and toward constitutional issues. More Fourth, Fifth, and
[Vol. 107: 1
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Sixth Amendment claims probably mean fewer self-defense claims and mens
rea arguments. This turns the standard conservative criticism of the law of
criminal procedure on its head. Ever since the 1960s, the right has argued that
criminal procedure frees too many of the guilty. The better criticism may be
that it helps to imprison too many of the innocent.
It also does little about the concern that, more than anything else,
prompted its creation. The post-1960 constitutionalization of criminal
procedure arose, in large part, out of the sense that the system was treating
black suspects and defendants much worse than white ones. Warren-era
constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination law"
But the criminal justice system is characterized by extraordinary
discretion-over the definition of crimes (legislatures can criminalize as much
as they wish), over enforcement (police and prosecutors can arrest and charge
whom they wish), and over funding (legislatures can allocate resources as they
wish). In a system so dominated by discretionary decisions, discrimination is
easy, and constitutional law has surprisingly little to say about it.
To some degree, these problems are the product of a particular set of
contingent circumstances. Vary the circumstances, and the problems would
look quite different. For example, we may someday return to the very low
crime-to-prosecutor ratios of the early 1960s, either because crime takes a
nosedive or because criminal justice budgets go through the roof (or both). If
that happens, prosecutorial discretion will seem less important, for prosecutors
will be able to pursue all strong cases and a good number of weak ones. Guilty
plea rates will fall as the proportion of contestable cases rises. More trials will
mean that the cost of constitutional regulation in this area will become more
visible to judges, which might lead the Supreme Court to alter the regulation
in important ways. This is just one set of speculations about one possible
scenario; other scenarios, pushing prosecutors and courts in very different
directions, could easily be spun out. The lesson seems clear: Generalizing is
dangerous, for the problems that afflict the system today are the consequence
of today's facts and today's law, and both facts and law are certain to change.
Yet some cautious generalizing is still possible. In a legislatively funded
system with state-paid prosecutors and defense attorneys, judge-made
procedural rights are bound to have some perverse effects, pushing prosecutors
and defense attorneys and legislators and even the judges themselves in
uncomfortable directions. The effects are impossible to measure, and they will
be larger or smaller depending on background circumstances. But they remain
real, and inevitable.
4. This observation is most often made about Fourth Amendment law See,. e g. Jow, HAKr ELY.
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980); Steiker, 3upra note 3. at 841-44 For an argument that the point
holds more broadly, see Michael J. Klarman. The Ptzzling Rertvance to Politcal Prcsi 77or. 77 VA
L. REV. 747, 763-66 (1991).
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Interestingly, judicial intervention in other aspects of the criminal justice
system-the definition of crimes and the funding of criminal defense-does
not seem likely to have these sorts of perverse effects. Constitutionalizing
procedure, in a world where substantive law and funding are the province of
legislatures, may tend to encourage bad substantive law and underfunding. But
constitutionalizing some aspects of substantive criminal law and defense
funding would not tend to encourage bad procedure, or bad anything else. Yet
substance and funding are the areas where courts have most deferred to
legislatures, where passivity rather than activism has been the judicial norm.
It may be that the broad structure of constitutional regulation of criminal
justice has it backward, that courts have been not too activist, but activist in
the wrong places.
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part I discusses the
twin sources of the problem: the allocation of power between the criminal
justice system's two bosses-courts and legislatures-and the nature of the law
of constitutional criminal procedure. Part II discusses how criminal litigation
is rationed in a system with public prosecutors and state-paid defense counsel,
and how that rationing process changes the effect of the constitutional rules
that govern criminal procedure. Part III suggests that courts and legislatures are
locked into a perverse dynamic, that the existing system pushes appellate
courts to make too much (and the wrong kind of) law, which in turn pushes
legislatures to fund criminal defense too stingily and to define substantive
criminal law too broadly. Part IV briefly raises the possibility of a different
sort of constitutional regulation, one focused more on criminal substance and
the funding of defense counsel and less on the details of criminal procedure.
These discussions are sketchy and speculative; the goal is to begin an
argument, not to end one. They are also one-sided: My aim is to suggest that
constitutional criminal procedure has substantial unappreciated costs; I do not
discuss its (better appreciated) benefits, which may also be substantial. The
argument thus does not lead to any confident bottom line. It does, however,
undermine what seems to be the confident bottom line of most judges and
most academics in the field-that the current approach to constitutional law
and criminal justice is unambiguously sound.
I. DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS AND THE STATE'S RESOURCES
A. Courts' Domain, Legislatures' Domain
Criminal procedure is, basically, a subset of constitutional law. That is
why the criminal procedure literature focuses so thoroughly on the latest
Supreme Court cases-in this area, the Supreme Court makes the relevant
policy judgments, albeit with some fleshing out by other federal and state
appellate courts. And once made, those judgments stick.
[Vol. 107: 1
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Or do they? Consider the effects of two other variables, both of which
legislatures control and both of which go far toward defining what the law of
criminal procedure means on the ground. The first is the scope of criminal
liability. Broader substantive criminal law allows the state to end-run much of
criminal procedure.5 In a world where trivial crimes stay on the books, or one
where routine traffic offenses count as crimes, the requirement of probable
cause to arrest may mean almost nothing. Officers can arrest for a minor
offense-everyone violates the traffic rules-in order to search or question a
suspect on a major one.6 This allows arrests and searches of suspected drug
dealers without any ex ante support for the suspicion, the very thing the
probable cause standard is supposed to forbid. In a world where sodomy laws
remain valid long after their enforcement has ceased, prosecutors can induce
guilty pleas in some problematic sexual assault cases-the need to prove
nonconsent disappears, and with it (again, in some cases) the ability to mount
a plausible defense. This amounts to convicting defendants of sexual assault
without proving the crime, by pointing to another crime that serves as the
excuse for punishment, but not the reason.
Notice that procedural constraints on police and prosecutors actually
encourage the government to behave in this fashion. One of the government's
biggest gains from overcriminalization is the ability to avoid costly criminal
procedure doctrines. Traffic "crimes" reduce the cost of the probable cause
requirement, just as no-longer-enforced sodomy laws reduce the cost of the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Those criminal procedure
doctrines thus raise the government's incentive to overcriminalize. Not only
can the state get around inconvenient constitutional limits by expanding
criminal law's scope; the limits themselves tend, at the margin, to induce the
expansion. These effects do not cover the whole of criminal litigation. But the
pair of examples offered above (and there are many others) shows how
thoroughly a state's definition of its criminal law can undermine important
parts of criminal procedure.
Which leads to the second variable legislatures control: They fund the
system. Legislatures decide how many police officers, prosecutors, and judges
to have, and how much to pay them. They also decide how generously to fund
criminal defense counsel in those cases (the majority)7 in which the court
5. The balance of this paragraph sketches an argument developed in more detail in William I Stuntu.
Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP LEGAL ISSUES I (1996)
6. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (holding that police can detain motorists where
there is probable cause to believe that they have violated traffic laws, regardless ol whether the stop is
pretextual).
7. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the "generally accepted indigency rate" Ior state felony
cases in the early 1980s was 48%. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. U S DEI"T Of- JUSTICE. NATIONAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 33 (1986). In 1962. the comparable figure was 43% See LE
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRMIINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS A FIELD STUDY
AND REPORT 7-8 (1965). By 1992, the comparable figure was almost 80% See Steven K Smith & Carol
J. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, BUREAU JUST. STAT SELECTED FINDINGS. Feb 1996. ,at I. 4
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appoints counsel.
Over the course of the past couple of decades, legislatures have exercised
this funding power to expand substantially the resources devoted to law
enforcement, though the budget increases appear less substantial in light of
parallel increases in crime. In constant dollars, total state and local
expenditures for prosecution and other government legal services trebled
between 1971 and 1990;' expenditures for police rose 60%." During the same
period, the number of index crimes (a figure that includes, basically, murder,
rape, robbery, arson, aggravated assault, and serious theft offenses) rose nearly
70%'--and that increase followed the 1960s, when such crimes rose more
than 187%." Those figures do not include drug offenses, which by 1990
8. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE-1993, at 3 tbl.l.3 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) [hereinafter 1993
SOURCEBOOKI (showing an 889% rise in state and local expenditures on prosecution and legal services,
excluding public defense); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES-I 996, at 483 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (showing that inflation during the
same period was 223%). This increase overstates the rise in expenditures on criminal prosecution. State
expenditures rose faster than those of local government, see 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra, at 3 tbl. 1.3, but the
mass of criminal cases were and are prosecuted by local officials.
9. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 3 tbl. 1.3 (stating that state and local expenditures on police
rose 418%). The figure in the text is discounted for inflation. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note
8, at 483.
10. Compare FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1980, at 41 tbl.2 (1981)
[hereinafter 1980 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS] (showing 8.6 million index crimes in 1971), with FBI,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1991, at 5 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS] (showing 14.5 million index crimes in 1990).
The National Crime Victimization Survey tells a different story; according to that survey, crime-not
just crime rates, but crime-actually declined between 1973 and 1990. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1973-90 TRENDS 9 tbl. I (1992)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION]. I have two reasons for using the FBI data rather than the estimates
provided by the victimization surveys. First, the FBI data are based on crime reports, which are likely to
correlate fairly strongly with cases presented to prosecutors for further action. Because the effect of criminal
procedure on prosecutors and defense lawyers depends more on the number of criminal cases than on the
number of crimes, this makes crime reports a more useful source than after-the-fact victim surveys.
The second reason is more speculative. The victimization surveys conflict with a number of other
indicators of crime-not only the number of crimes reported to the police, but numbers of arrests, felony
prosecutions, and convictions as well. Each of those figures rose sharply during the relevant time period.
Arrests rose 48% from 1976 to 1990. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE-1978, at 478 tbl.4.1 (Nicolette Parisi et al. eds., 1979), with BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE-1991, at 432 tbl.4.1
(1992) [hereinafter 1991 SOURCEBOOK]. Felony filings by state and local prosecutors more than doubled
from 1978 to 1991. See infra note 19. State court felony convictions rose 53% from 1986 to 1992 (pre-
1986 data does not allow for good cross-time comparison). Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1986, at 2 tbl.l (1989), with BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1992, at 2 tbl.l
(1995). All these indicators are in some tension with flat or declining crime through the 1970s and 1980s.
To be sure, it is possible that the rise in arrests and prosecutions reflects both greater efficiency on the part
of police and prosecutors and a greater desire to "crack down" on criminals, and that crime rates were
declining even while arrest, prosecution, and conviction rates were rising. But the magnitude of this
supposed efficiency gain is, at the least, surprising; it requires some account of why police, prosecutors,
and courts all sought to punish a steadily and substantially higher proportion of criminals through the 1970s
and 1980s. The more natural assumption is that increases in crime generated at least some of the increases
in arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.
11. See FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1972, at 61 tbl.2 (1972) [hereinafter
1972 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].
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accounted for one-third of all state felony convictions;12 two decades earlier,
drugs had been a small part of prosecutors' dockets.13 The overall picture is
of prosecutorial budgets that have outstripped the rise in crime during the
1970s and 1980s, coupled with police budgets that have not. On the other
hand, though comparable budget data on the 1960s are hard to come by, it
seems unlikely that either police or prosecutors' offices have kept pace with
the huge rise in crime since the early 1960s."4
Criminal defense has been treated both more and less generously. Budgets
in the early 1970s saw enormous percentage increases, but from a very low
baseline.' 5 By the late 1970s, the increases had slowed considerably. Total
spending on indigent defense rose slightly more than 60% in constant dollars
between 1979 and 1990;6 state and local spending on indigents roughly
doubled. 7 Meanwhile, the percentage of cases in which defendants were
given appointed counsel was also rising, from just under half in the late 1970s
and early 1980s to 80% by 1992." s And the total number of criminal cases
was rising as well: State court felony filings more than doubled between 1978
and 1990." Thus, notwithstanding nominal budget increases, spending on
12. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, %upra note 8, at 535 tbl 5 55
13. Drug cases comprised less than 5% of state criminal charges in 1971 See BUREAU Of- JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE-1973. at 325 tbl 5 32 (1973)
[hereinafter 1973 SOURCEBOOK]. Data on the percentage of felon), drug convictions for 1971 or thereabouts
is unavailable. Another indication of the growth in importance of drug cases is the number of drug arrests.
which more than quintupled from 1968 to 1988. See Robert Reinhold, Police. Hani Pres3ed in Drug War.
Are Turning to Preventive Efforts, N.Y. TIMFS. Dec 28, 1989. at Al (reporting that Justicc Department
statistics show anests for drug violations rising from 162.177 in 1968 to 850.034 in 1988)
14. I am unaware of any nationwide data on state and local expenditures on criminal prosecution
during the 1960s. Presumably budgets rose somewhat during the course of that decade It seems unlikely.
however, that they rose even close to proportionately with the rise in serious crime. FBI index cnmes
nearly trebled from 1961 to 1971. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text Absent good data, the
safest assumption is that budgets fell far behind crime increases in the 1960s. and the large increases of
the 1970s were designed to catch up. The increases would have accomplished that purpose had drug crime
not steeply increased during the 1970s and 1980s.
15. Compare 1973 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 24 thl 1 2 (stating that state and local expenditures
on public defense in 1970 were $46 million), wtth BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. U S DEP'T OF JUSTICE.
SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE-1980, at 7 tbl.I 4 (listing the comparable figure for 1978 as S315
million).
16. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 3 thl 1 3 (showing an increase in total spending on
indigent defense of 192% between 1979 and 1990). The consumer price index rose 80% during the same
period. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 8, at 483
17. State and local spending on indigent defense increased 274% in nominal dollars during the same
period. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 3 tbl.1.3 Given the inllation figures stated supra note 16.
in constant dollars the increase was 108%.
18. See supra note 7.
19. Compare NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS ANNUAL
REPORT 1984, at 189-90 tbl.35 (1986) [hereinafter 1984 CASELOAD STATISTICI (showing a 36% increase
in felony filings from 1978 to 1984), witi NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS. STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 37 tbl.l.25 (1993) Ihereinafter 1991 CASELOAD STATIsnCSl
(showing a 51% increase in felony filings from 1985 to 1991). If filings were constant from 1984 to 1985.
this would mean a 105% increase from 1978 to 1991. The increase was probably greater, as the number
of filings was growing especially rapidly in the mid-1980s See 1991 CASELOAD STATISTICS. supra. at 37
tbl.l.25 (showing a 10% increase from 1985 to 1986)
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indigent defendants in constant dollars per case appears to have declined
significantly between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.
The predictable result is public defenders' offices with very large ratios of
cases to lawyers. One recent study found a jurisdiction in which some public
defenders represented over four hundred felony defendants in an eight-month
span, and the average representation was more than half that number.2" In
another jurisdiction, some lawyers represented over one thousand misdemeanor
defendants in one year; again the averages were not vastly different.2, These
numbers are, of course, extreme; more typical ratios are no doubt lower
(though little data exist on what more typical ratios are). Still, those familiar
with the system agree that the story these numbers tell is generally true: Public
defenders are terribly overburdened.22
The story is essentially the same in jurisdictions that use separately
appointed defense counsel rather than public defenders. Such counsel are
usually paid according to statutory fee schedules that fix hourly amounts,
sometimes varying the amount for pretrial preparation, trial, and appeal. Often
the hourly fees are quite low: In Alabama, defense counsel receive $20 per
hour for out-of-court time;23 in New York, the figure is $25.24 Not all the
hourly rates are so stingy: Nevada offers $75 per hour,25 and rates of $40 per
hour are not unusual.26 The real key to the statutory fee schedules, however,
is not the hourly amounts but the caps on total fees. Most states have such
caps;21 they range as low as $26528 and go no higher than $3500 for
20. See RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, ANIERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE
CRISIS 8 (1993).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., ROBERT BURKE ET AL., NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASs'N, INDIGENT DEFENSE
CASELOADS AND COMMON SENSE: AN UPDATE 3-5 (1992); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New
Public Defender for the 21st Century, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 81, 85-86; see also LISA
J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE SHADOWS OF REPUTE 103-04 (1987)
(discussing docket pressures and limits on training of new public defenders). The current trend in the
literature is to argue that, despite these resource constraints, public defenders do a surprisingly good job.
See, e.g., ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INDIGENT DEFENDERS GET THE
JOB DONE AND DONE WELL (1992); John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1215 (1994).
23. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1995).
24. See N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
25. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7.125.1 (Michie Supp. 1995).
26. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
977.08(4m)(b) (West Supp. 1996); ALASKA ADMIN. R. 12(d)(2)(F).
27. Virtually all states that statutorily specify fees for appointed counsel have caps. Some states do
not specify fees by statute, but rather provide that a judicial or executive commission will set fees. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-209(g) (Michie Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211 D, § 12 (West
Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 151.430(5)-.430(6) (1995). Finally, a large number of states provide that
fees are at the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013 (West 1989); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 987.2(a) (West Supp. 1997). As there is no contrary indication in the literature on this
subject, I assume that those states that do not statutorily specify fees pay counsel at rates comparable to
those states that do.
28. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2-163 (Michie 1995).
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noncapital felonies.2 9 The typical range is $500 to S100O0. These caps can
be waived for good cause, but the governing statutes seem designed to ensure
that waiver is exceptional, typically requiring a finding that the waiver was
"necessary" or the circumstances "extraordinary." 3' Thus, a typical appointed
defense lawyer faces something like the following pay scale: $30 or $40 an
hour for the first twenty to thirty hours, and zero thereafter.
This phenomenon is familiar, and it is the source of a familiar complaint.
For at least the past decade, one of the standard attacks on the criminal justice
system has been the attack on its poverty-especially the poverty of defense
counsel, whose pay scales seem to preclude more than nominal litigation in
more than a tiny number of cases.3 - But for all the (justified) complaining
about resources, no one has paid much attention to the way the resources relate
to, and perhaps respond to, defendants' rights-to the way legislative funding
decisions bear on the judge-made law that governs the criminal process, and
vice versa.
In other areas the relationship is well known. When the Reagan
Administration sought to deregulate various private industries, it did not devote
its energies solely to pushing legislation that would overturn objectionable
rules. Opponents of regulation also sought to cut funding for agencies that
issued the kind of rules the opponents disliked." The idea behind the strategy
was clear enough: Less money to an agency that makes bad policy means less
bad policy. The disagreement was over substantive law, but funding strategies
are valuable weapons in substantive fights.
The criminal justice system is a prime candidate for the same approach.
There are a great many constitutional rules, most of which are highly
contestable. The rules are produced by a court system that acts quite
independently of legislative preference, at least in this area. (Mapp v. Ohio3'
29. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355 8(G)(2) (West Supp 1997). S C CoDE A, ,N § 17-3.
50(A).
30. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.070 (Michic 1992) (S1000); MIss CODE: A,%N § 99-15-17
(1994) ($1000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:5 (1986) ($500). ALASKA AD.%tIN R 12(dX2)(F) ($500)
31. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-5(b) (1990) (allowing waiver in extraordinary circumstances),
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.070(3) (Michie 1992) (stating that fees in excess of the cap arc presumptively
prohibited); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21(b) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing waiver only when necessary to
provide compensation for services of an unusual nature and requiring the chief judge of the district to
approve any excess); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:5 (1986) (allowing waiver only in certain lelony cases
with extraordinary circumstances); TENN. CODE ANN § 40-14-207(aX2) (1990) (allowing waiver when
necessary to provide fair compensation and requiring approval for excess from the chief justice of the state
supreme court).
32. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D Friedman. Rethinking Indigent Defene Prourng
Effective Representation Through Connumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73. 93-94 (1993); sources cited 3upra note 22
33. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulator Reform ti tie Reagan Era. 45 MD L REtv 253. 263 11986).
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspecrive, 38 STAN L REv 1189. 1318 (1986)
34. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp applied the ledera exclusionary rule. then and now the dominant
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, to the states See id at 655-57
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and Miranda v. Arizona 5 were hardly examples of majoritarian lawmaking.)
Perhaps more so than anywhere else in constitutional law, in criminal
procedure the broad exercise of judicial power tends to be justified precisely
by legislators' unwillingness to protect constitutional interests. Yet these judge-
made rules are enforced through the efforts of criminal defense counsel who,
in most cases, are paid by the state-the same state whose preferences the
rules purport to trump. By buying less criminal defense, the state can buy less
enforcement of constitutional criminal procedure. It can, to some degree, trump
the trump. Of course, if it does so it necessarily also buys less of whatever else
criminal defense counsel do.
B. Criminal Procedure as an Incomplete Regulatory System
What one thinks of this dynamic depends in part on the nature of the law
criminal defense counsel enforce. Constitutional criminal procedure protects
criminal defendants' rights. As elsewhere in constitutional law, the rights are
almost all negative; defendants have the right to be free from certain kinds of
government conduct. More particularly, they have the right to be free from
criminal conviction except when the government follows a given set of
procedures. Thus, defendants' rights are really the system's rules, rules that
regulate the conduct of the various actors who take part in the process by
which some criminal defendants are convicted and punished.
Broadly speaking, those rules do three things that separate the law of
criminal procedure from the mostly nonconstitutional law of civil procedure.
The first is obvious: Criminal procedure skews errors in defendants' favor, as
by requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.36 The second is more
subtle and often goes unnoticed, though it is extremely important as a practical
matter: Constitutional criminal procedure limits trial judges' flexibility; it
restricts a kind of discretionary trial management that is routine in civil
cases. 37 Criminal procedure's third role is more akin to tort than to
conventional procedure: The law extensively regulates the conduct of various
actors in the system, ranging from police officers and prosecutors to defense
attorneys and court personnel. All three sorts of law depend for their
enforcement on an adequate level of litigation by defendants, meaning in
practice by defense counsel. Nevertheless, the system leaves the level of
defense litigation (and the level of government litigation as well)
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda required police to warn suspects of their right to remain silent and
their right to have counsel present during questioning, and held that statements obtained after these rights
were read would be admissible only if the government carried a "heavy burden" of showing that these
rights were waived "knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 467-75.
36. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
37. For a good discussion of the nature and sources of this phenomenon in the civil sphere, see Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376 (1982).
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constitutionally unregulated, and hence subject to legislative control.
The first of these three roles requires little discussion. Placing a heavy
burden of proof on the government in criminal cases is uncontroversial, since
one of the few propositions in this area about which everyone agrees is that
the ratio of guilty acquittals to innocent convictions should be high. There are
a few other doctrines of this sort-Gideon's requirement that indigent
defendants receive counsel is a prime example 3"-but not many.
The second is more complicated and deserves a brief detour. In civil cases
the scope and length of discovery are to a large degree within the control of
trial judges, who can give the parties as much or as little rope as the judges
wish.39 So too, in civil cases judges have a great deal of authority to bar
particular lines of relevant questioning or argument or particular bodies of
relevant evidence on the ground that they are unduly prejudicial or simply a
waste of time.' Such decisions have some legal limits, but the limits do not
matter much, if only because of the gentleness of abuse-of-discretion appellate
review.4" The upshot is a great deal of negative judicial control in civil cases
at the trial level, with judges able to cabin the parties' presentation of their
cases. Our system of civil adjudication is adversarial; it rests on the idea of
party control. But party control is bounded, and bounded significantly, by the
power of trial judges.
Criminal litigation is different. A major portion of discovery is
constitutionalized-the government must turn over exculpatory evidence,
period.4 2 Trial judges have no power to truncate this requirement. The
defendant's right to confront opposing witnesses means that trial court
decisions to cut off a line of defense cross-examination at trial can raise
substantial constitutional concerns.43 The right to compulsory process means
that decisions barring particular defense witnesses also trigger constitutional
alarm bells.' Where these Sixth Amendment rights fail, the Due Process
38. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon itself. 22 state attorneys general joined
in an amicus brief on the defendant's side. See id. at 336 This was an early indication of the widespread
support the right to appointed counsel would enjoy, no doubt because that right, like the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard, is so obviously protective of innocent defendants
39. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Stephen C YeaelI. The Misunderztood Consequences
of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631. 649-54 Yea.ell's essay shows how this aspect o
discovery practice is part of a larger shift in power from appellate courts to rial courts. a shift tha began
early in this century and has accelerated since.
40. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; GRAHAM C. ULLY, AN INTRODUCTIoN TO THE LAw of- EVIDE cE
36-37 (1978).
41. For the classic discussion (and criticism) of the abuse-of-discretion standard. see Henry J Friendly.
Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982)
42. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) Note that this requirement extends to evidence that
the defendant has not requested. See United States v Agurs, 427 U S 97 (1976)
43. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per cunam) Olden is discussed aifra notes
47-51 and accompanying text.
44. For still-classic discussions, see Peter Westen, The Compulsor) Process Clause, 73 MitcH L Rhzv
71 (1974); and Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process A Unified 77teorn' of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 567 (1978).
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Clause gives defendants a potential claim whenever the trial court takes some
defense evidence or argument off the table a.4  These various constitutional
claims do not always win. On the contrary, as with all criminal procedure
claims, defendants usually lose. And even when defendants win on the merits
of the claim, they can lose cases if appellate courts find errors harmless. But
one should not minimize the shadow these rights cast. Harmless error review
in criminal procedure is a far cry from its equivalent in civil procedure; it
leaves much less room to the discretion of trial courts.46 And while
constitutional challenges to trial management are not often litigated (and
usually lose when they are), they are always potentially present, creating a risk
of appellate litigation and reversal for trial court judgments that would go
unchallenged in civil cases.
An obscure recent Supreme Court case makes the point nicely. In Olden
v. Kentucky,a7 a black man was charged with raping a white woman in his car
late at night. After the alleged rape, the defendant drove the victim, at her
request, to a friend's house. The victim's friend was a married black man.
When she got out of the car, the victim immediately reported the rape to her
friend, whose testimony to that effect was offered at trial some months later.48
The defense sought to show that at the time of trial the victim and her friend
were sexually involved. By this time, the friend had left his wife. The theory
was that since the two were lovers now, they might have been lovers at the
time of the alleged rape, which would have given the victim reason to concoct
the rape story as a means of explaining why she was driving around with the
defendant late at night. The trial court barred the whole line of questioning,
saying that the inferences were too tenuous, the issue was too much of a
distraction, and there was obvious potential prejudice to the government.49
(The defense seemed to be trying to suggest to the jury that the victim liked
45. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that, in the sentencing phase of
a capital murder trial, a defendant must be allowed to introduce evidence of good behavior in prison while
awaiting trial to rebut the prosecutor's contention that the defendant would pose disciplinary problems if
sentenced to prison).
46. In civil cases, error is harmless unless it "appears ... inconsistent with substantial justice" and
"affect[s] the substantial rights of the parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 61; see 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIOHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2881-88 (1995). This standard holds as well
for nonconstitutional errors in criminal cases, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), and for
constitutional errors found on habeas corpus, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). For
constitutional errors on direct appeal, however, the standard is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a much
tougher threshold. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). This is worth emphasizing because the
criminal procedure literature on harmless error tends to focus on the cases where errors are found harmless,
thereby creating the impression that appellate review of criminal procedure claims is lax. See, e.g., Stephen
H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOOY 421 (1980):
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973); Tom Stacy & Kim
Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79 (1988). By the standards the
legal system employs elsewhere, this impression is false.
47. 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam).
48. See id. at 228-29 (per curiam).
49. See id. at 229-30 (per curiam).
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sex with black men, and so probably consented to sex with the defendant.)5'
The Supreme Court reversed in a brief per curiam opinion with only one
dissent, and that not on the merits. 5' Not only did the trial court's decision
violate Olden's right to confront the witnesses against him; the decision clearly
violated Olden's rights. The Court treated the case as easy. Olden's claim was,
to use the current vemacular, a "slam dunk."
Cases like Olden send a powerful signal. Judges may and do shape
criminal trials, but they do so at much greater risk of reversal than when they
exercise the same kind of control over civil litigation. This risk is, of course,
one-sided, given both the nature of the constitutional protections and the
longstanding rule barring appeal of acquittals. Yet in a world in which the
defense has more leeway, it seems plausible to suppose the government will
be given a fair amount of leeway too. Trial judges are likely to be at least
roughly reciprocal in terms of their approach to trial management. So the effect
of this part of constitutional criminal procedure may be to create a presumptive
right to go where the litigators want, with judicial limits imposed only for very
good reason. That heightened degree of party control is then enforced by a
system of Olden-style, ad hoc appellate policing of discretionary trial court
judgments.
The criminal procedure literature treats that system as relatively
unimportant. The partial constitutionalization of trial management has received
little comment, drowned out by discussions of other aspects of the criminal
procedure revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. This inattention is a serious
mistake. Consider the massive, unwieldy nature of O.J. Simpson's trial. That
fiasco had many causes, not least of which was the trial judge's lax
management of the case. It has become commonplace to observe that a
different judge might have forced the parties to present their cases much more
tightly and much more quickly)5 Yet the chances of a streamlined Simpson
trial were always smaller than this standard line suggests. More aggressive
50. That was the view taken by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which emphasiLcd the harm to the
victim's credibility that would have been caused even by a showing that the vctim was involved with a
black man at the time of the trial. See id. at 231 (per curtan) (quoting the unreported opinion of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals).
51. Justice Marshall's lone dissent said nothing about the issue or facts in Olden. but rested solely on
his objection to summary dispositions. See id. at 233-34 (Marshall. J, dissenting)
52. See, e.g., JEFFREY TOOBiN, THE RUN OF His LIFE: THE PEOPLE V 0_3 SLtPsON 347 (1996)
Toobin writes:
Ito floundered. Courtroom discipline fluctuated according to the judge's press clippings
When, as happened periodically, a big story in the Los Angeles Thne3 or on one of the networks
chided him for letting the case drag on. the judge would snap to attention for a day or two.
refusing to hold sidebars and generally pushing things along His resolve would then fade untitl
the next critical story. After Newsweek put Ito's picture on the cover under the hcadltne WHAT
A MESS, the judge lashed back at the press by permanently evicting two reporters from the
courtroom, ostensibly for talking.... When The Net, York Tnnes published a hostile editorial
entitled "Bankers' Hours for the O.J. Case?" Ito lengthened the court day Fundamentally.
though, nothing much changed.
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management of the trial would have substantially raised the odds that a
conviction (had one been obtained) would have been reversed, and trial judges
dislike reversals.53 The threat of reversal was much weaker before
constitutional law began to regulate trial management, which may be why one
finds no analogues to the Simpson trial before the late 1960s. The past hundred
years have seen many "trials of the century"-Lizzie Borden, Sacco and
Vanzetti, the Lindbergh kidnapping case, Lucky Luciano, and the Rosenbergs
are the classic examples from roughly the first half of that period. Yet in all
the cases just mentioned the defendants' trials lasted between two and six
weeks. 54 Trials in more contemporary cases of this sort-Charles Manson,
Patty Hearst, John Hinckley, Jr., Klaus von Bulow, the Menendez brothers,
and, of course, Simpson-tend to be considerably longer. The length of those
trials ranged from six weeks to more than eight months, with an average length
of four months.55 (Not coincidentally, defendants also win these cases more
often than they used to.)56 In short, cases like Simpson's may not be
inevitable today, but they are at least understandable. Forty years ago, they
weren't. The ad hoc constitutional regulation of trial management helps to
explain why.
The third key aspect of the law of constitutional criminal procedure is
captured by famous Warren-era cases such as Mapp5 and Miranda.5" These
cases, and the many others like them, are more explicitly regulatory: They tell
the police, prosecutors, the court system, and even defense lawyers what not
53. That trial judges dislike reversals is universally assumed though almost never examined. For a rare
(brief) examination, see Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Fonvard-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisioniaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994). For a more extended discussion that rules
out several possible explanations for the judicial taste for affirmance, see Richard S. Higgins & Paul H.
Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1980).
54. Lizzie Borden's trial was the shortest, lasting a mere two weeks. See EDMUND PEARSON, TRIAL
OF LIZZIE BORDEN 95 (1937). The Rosenbergs' trial lasted three weeks. See WALTER SCHNEIR & MIRIAM
SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST 119, 167 (1965). Luciano's trial, which made its prosecutor a
national political figure, lasted three-and-a-half weeks. See MARY M. STOLBERO, FIGHTING ORGANIZED
CRIME: POLITICS, JUSTICE, AND THE LEGACY OF THOMAS E. DEWEY 134, 152 (1995). The trial of Sacco
and Vanzetti lasted six weeks, see Louis JOUGHIN & EDMUND M. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND
VANZETTI 10-11 (1948), as did Bruno Hauptmann's trial, see GEORGE WALLER, KIDNAP: THE STORY OF
THE LINDBERGH CASE 254, 467 (1961).
55. Hearst's and Hinckley's trials lasted seven weeks each. See THE TRIAL OF PARTY HEARST 1, 602
(1976) (reprinting the trial proceedings); LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF
JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 89 (1984). Von Bulow's first trial lasted more than two months; his second trial
went six weeks. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INSIDE THE VON BULOW CASE 42,
182, 229 (1986). The Menendez brothers' first trial lasted five months. See HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY:
THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZ JUROR at xix (1995). The trial of Manson and his "family" lasted seven
months. See GEORGE BISHOP, WITNESS TO EVIL 416 (1971). Simpson's lasted more than eight months. See
TooBIN, supra note 52, at 242, 429.
56. Of the more recent cases mentioned in the text, John Hinckley, Jr., Klaus von Bulow, and O.J.
Simpson won, while the Menendez brothers gained a mistrial before being retried and convicted; Charles
Manson and Patricia Hearst both lost. Of the earlier defendants, only Lizzie Borden was acquitted; all the
others-Sacco and Vanzetti, Bruno Hauptmann (the defendant in the Lindbergh kidnap-murder prosecution),
Lucky Luciano, and the Rosenbergs-were convicted.
57. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to do and what will happen if they do it. This part of criminal procedure has
no real analogue in civil procedure doctrine. It is more like a species of tort
law, defining liability rules for a given set of actors in the criminal justice
system but using the threat of reversal in criminal litigation rather than
damages or injunctive relief to enforce those standards.
The massive bodies of law governing police investigation are the largest
and best example. When the police frisk a suspect on the street, make an
arrest, search or impound a car, enter a dwelling or office, or ask a suspect
questions, Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules govern their conduct. Violation
of those rules generally leads to suppression of evidence discovered during the
course of the violation, and often to suppression of the fruits of that discovery
as well,5 9 so the rules themselves are developed and enforced in criminal
proceedings.
The most striking thing about this law is its sheer size. Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law (along with a few scattered doctrines based on the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments) do not just set outer boundaries for police conduct,
with the day-to-day judgments governed by state or local law or custom. With
respect to police misconduct, constitutional criminal procedure occupies the
field. Professor LaFave's treatise on the law of search and seizure spans five
volumes," and those five volumes do not touch Miranda's constitutional code
of police questioning, with its elaborate doctrines defining when suspects are
in custody,6 what counts as police interrogation, '2 and (especially) the
59. Evidence discovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation is ordinarily inadmissible Se'
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TRFATIsh ON THtf FouRTH A§.m. u2'r I1 4 (3d ed
1996) (discussing the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine) There is an exception for some illegal serches
conducted in good faith, but as of now that exception applies only in warrant cases See United States v
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). With respect to pohce interrogation, Miranda establishes its own exclusionary
rule. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. But unlike Fourth Amendment violations. Miranla violations do not
ordinarily require suppression of fruits of the violation; suppression is limited to the illegally obtaind
statements themselves. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U S 298, 304-09 (1985)
60. See LAFAVE, supra note 59.
61. The major Supreme Court cases give some Ilavor of the doctrine's complexity See Berkemer
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that traffic stops are not necessarily custodial, though arrests are),
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that questioning by a probation officcr in a probation
office during a regular appointment is not custodial), California v Beheler. 463 U S 1121 (1983) (per
curiain) (holding that the defendant's presence at a police station was voluntary even though an oflficer
accompanied him there); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U S 492 (1977) (per cunam) (holding that questioning
in a police station is not custodial if the suspect's presence was voluntary) The bottom line is that custody
turns on all the circumstances; is usually, but not always, present when the suspect is in a police station.
is usually absent at brief street stops but (again) not always, and does not necessarily track any other legal
categories such as arrests or stops.
62. "Interrogation" is present when officers have engaged in 'either express questioning or its
functional equivalent." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U S 291, 300-01 (1980) The "functtonal equivalent"
of direct questioning, in turn, consists of "words or actions on the pan of police officers that they should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" i at 302 The "reasonabl) likely"
test, however, is to be applied with an eye not merely to the reasonable loresceability and likelihood of
incriminating responses, but with an emphasis on the coerciveness (or lack thereof) of the relevant police
tactic. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that an undercover police olicer had not
triggered Miranda safeguards when he elicited a voluntary confession from an inmate). Arizona v Mauro.
481 U.S. 520 (1987) (holding that a police officer's tape recording of a conversation bct%%cen the suspect
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conditions that must be met for a valid waiver of the suspect's rights.63 All
these doctrines amount to a vast constitutional tort law for the police.
The tendency is to think that constitutional regulation of this sort begins
and ends with the police. In fact, criminal procedure regulates much more than
police investigation. A wide variety of constitutional doctrines aim to channel
the conduct of some set of actors in the system in order to get them to behave
in a way that will make the system as a whole function better.
The examples are endless. Consider the large bodies of law that govern
grand jury' and petit jury selection65 (and that require automatic reversal
of criminal convictions in case of violation66). Selection practices that were
close to universal a couple of decades ago, such as the use of "key man"
and his wife did not constitute interrogation for purposes of Miranda). None of this answers a question that
has cropped up repeatedly in lower courts: Does a police question or comment given in response to a
question by the suspect count as interrogation? For analyses of that question, see, for example, United
States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1993); and People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1993) (in bank).
63. Miranda waiver doctrine breaks down into several distinct bodies of law. First are the cases that
define whether the warnings given to the suspect were adequate. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S.
195 (1989). Then there are the many cases that define whether, once the suspect received the requisite
warnings and agreed to talk, the decision to talk was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See, e.g., Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Next are the cases that determine whether the suspect invoked either his
right to counsel or his right to remain silent. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). These
lead to the several lines of cases that define the consequences of such invocations. See, e.g., Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (barring police-initiated post-invocation questioning even where the
suspect was allowed to consult with his attorney); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (barring post-
invocation questioning about different crimes); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (barring most
questioning after an invocation of the right to counsel); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)
(permitting questioning after an invocation of the right to remain silent, where the questioning was
conducted by different officers and two hours had elapsed). Finally, there are cases in which the suspect
invoked his rights but reinitiated contact with the police, thereby re-triggering the more lenient Miranda-
waiver regime. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). And this is only a capsule summary.
64. Constitutional law regulates grand jury selection in three distinct ways. First, the Equal Protection
Clause forbids discriminatory selection practices. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
Discrimination must be intentional, of course, but intent seems to mean something different (and to be less
difficult to prove) in grand jury cases than in other kinds of equal protection cases. See Daniel R. Ortiz,
The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1119-26 (1989). Second, the Equal
Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreman. See WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.3(b), at 624-26 (1985). Third, the Fifth
Amendment requires that grand juries be selected from a fair cross-section of the community. See id. §
15.4(d), at 702-03.
65. Petit jury selection is governed both by the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement, see
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), and by the Equal Protection Clause, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986). Fair cross-section violations apply only to the pool from which the jury is drawn, not to
the jury itself. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986). Equal protection violations include
intentional race- or sex-based use of peremptory challenges. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 130-31 (1994); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. The law regulating use of peremptory challenges has, of
course, exploded in the decade since Batson was decided.
66. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that grand jury discrimination is subject to an automatic
reversal rule. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986). Elsewhere, automatic reversal seems
to be assumed without discussion. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (reversing a defendant's conviction
based on an equal protection violation in the selection of a petit jury, without discussing prejudice); Duren,
439 U.S. 357 (1979) (reversing a defendant's conviction without discussing prejudice to the defendant from
a violation of the fair cross-section requirement in the selection of the jury venire). For an interesting
discussion of what the automatic reversal rule says about the substance of the law governing jury selection,
see Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth
Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996).
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systems and free play for peremptory challenges, are now either flatly
unconstitutional or pose a serious risk of unconstitutionality in particular
cases.6 7 Or, consider the less massive but also less penetrable double jeopardy
doctrines governing the granting and effect of mistrials" and the effect of
reversing convictions on appeal.69 Or the law of ineffective assistance of
counsel, 7 including conflict-of-interest doctrine,7 which plays the role that
legal malpractice and legal ethics together play in civil litigation. All these
bodies of law are substantial and detailed, each is the prime source of the
regulated actors' legal obligation within its sphere, and all are enforced through
ordinary criminal litigation. Along with the law of police investigation, these
areas have one more thing in common: All have seen vast doctrinal expansion
over the past generation.
Many of these doctrines are accuracy-enhancing in a broad sense. Perhaps,
all else being equal (a huge qualifier), a system that follows current Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rules on juries will lead to fewer wrongful convictions
than a system that ignores those rules. Law of this sort is thus different from
most of criminal procedure's extensive regulation of the police, in which
accuracy plays a very small role. But this sort of law should not be confused
with doctrines that seek simply to tilt errors in the defendant's favor, like the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. The point of criminal procedure's
regulatory doctrines is sometimes accuracy, but not accuracy in any particular
case-rather, the point is to get prosecutors, court personnel, and defense
attorneys to behave properly.
So the law of criminal procedure establishes a detailed regulatory system.
That law covers a wide range of issues that elsewhere are not part of the law
of procedure at all--consider search and seizure, or ineffective assistance of
counsel. With respect to more paradigmatically procedural issues, criminal
procedure leaves less room than does civil procedure for discretionary control
by the court system on the ground-recall Olden.72 There is an enormous
67. On the constitutional problems with "'key man" systems, see Castaneda. 430 U S at 497. where
the Court noted that although such systems are facially constitutional, they are -highly subjective'" and
therefore "susceptible of abuse." Peremptory challenges are now unconstitutional if they are motivated by
race or gender. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31; Batson, 476 U.S. at 89
68. Reprosecution following a mistrial is permitted only if the mistrial was manifestly necessary See
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461-65 (1973). What constitutes manifest necessity is impossible to
explain concisely. For the leading Supreme Court cases other than Somerville, see Oregon v Kennedv. 456
U.S. 667 (1982); Arizona v. Wasngton, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); United States v Jorn. 400 U S 470 (1971).
and Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
69. Whether the defendant may be reined following reversal of a conviction depends on the reason
for the reversal. Compare Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) (permitting retrial when reversal was
based on the improper admission of a prior criminal conviction), iw-ah Burks v United States. 437 U S 1
(1978) (barring retrial when reversal was based on insufficient evidence) If reversal is based on the iwetght
of the evidence rather than its insufficiency, retrial may be allowed See Tibbs v Florida. 457 U S 31
(1982).
70. For the basic test, see Strickland v. Washington. 466 U S 668. 687-96 (1984)
71. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
72. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curtain), see 3upra text accompanying notes 47-51
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amount of regulation, and appellate courts are the dominant regulators.
This vast body of law depends for its enforcement on criminal defense
counsel, the private attorneys general of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments.73 One might suppose, therefore, that constitutional law would
contain a well-developed set of doctrines ensuring that defense counsel actually
play the role for which the system casts them. Such doctrines do not exist.
Ineffective assistance law is important and claims arising under that law are
frequently raised, but the doctrine does very little about the failure adequately
to enforce constitutional rules. Defendants tend to win ineffective assistance
claims only when their lawyers had a conflict of interest or made some discrete
error of great magnitude.74 The failure to raise claims that constitutional law
might otherwise make available (and, even more so, the failure to investigate
such claims) is rarely the ground for a finding of attorney ineffectiveness."
And, of course, most legal claims in most cases are probable losers, so it is
easy for the government to argue that even a given winning claim that counsel
failed to make did not look like a winner ex ante. Given the standard used for
a finding of attorney ineffectiveness-basically, gross negligence-that
argument tends to be quite successful.
To put it another way, ineffective assistance doctrine tolerates a very low
activity level by defense attorneys. The law operates from the premise that
effective representation can be minimal-as in many cases it can. (Think about
the many plea-bargained cases that are resolved based on a few minutes'
meeting between defense counsel and her client and a similarly brief meeting
between defense counsel and the prosecutor.)76  Once that proposition is
73. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1988).
74. Proving this statement is impossible; I can only invite the reader to test this characterization against
the reported cases, which are far too many to cite. The pattern in question is the natural consequence of
two features of ineffective assistance doctrine. The first is Strickland's emphasis on avoiding hindsight in
assessing defense attorney performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91. Ironically, this stance leads
to a good deal of hindsight, but only in one direction: After-the-fact rationalizations of defense attorney
choices carry weight, while after-the-fact assessments of the consequences of those choices do not. The
upshot is that only the kind of choice that is unjustifiable on its face can be the basis for a finding of
attorney ineffectiveness. The second key feature of the doctrine is the absence of a required showing of
prejudice to establish conflicts of interest (as opposed to other sorts of ineffective assistance, where
prejudice must be shown). See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50. The test laid out in Cuyler allows for reversal
based on a conflict of interest whenever the conflict adversely affected the representation, not merely when
the effect was unreasonable or seriously harmful. See id. at 348-50. Thus ineffective assistance doctrine
regulates counsel's loyalty a good deal more stringently than it regulates counsel's performance.
75. The exceptions to this general rule are revealing. For example, in Kinunelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365 (1986), counsel for a rape defendant failed to move in a timely fashion to suppress the bedshecet
and associated lab tests that proved his client had indeed had sex with the victim. The sheet was obtained
in a warrantless search of the defendant's apartment. See id. at 368-70. With it, the government could
convict Morrison with ease; without it, there was no case. Given the circumstances, it is hard to imagine
a more serious error than failing to move to suppress. Although the Supreme Court found that the defendant
in Kimmelman had received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel, less extreme errors of this sort
tend not to generate a finding of attorney ineffectiveness.
76. On the frequency of such cases, see, for example, MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAININO 35
(1978); and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
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granted, it becomes difficult to separate low-activity but good representation
from laziness or incompetence. Current Sixth Amendment doctrine responds
by basing findings of ineffective assistance mostly on identifiable gross errors
rather than on inactivity.
And nothing in the law of criminal procedure regulates how much states
must spend on lawyers for defendants. This too is a consequence of ineffective
assistance doctrine. In order to make out an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, a defendant must show, first, that his lawyer failed to provide
constitutionally adequate assistance in his case and, second, that this failure
may well have caused the defendant to lose his case. 7 This test rules out
claims based on inadequate resources. If defense counsel did indeed fail to
provide constitutionally adequate assistance, the state's pay scale is
irrelevant-the defendant wins no matter how well or poorly counsel was paid.
If, on the other hand, defense counsel met the constitutional performance
standard, the state's pay scale is again irrelevant-the defendant loses
regardless of attorney pay because he got what the Sixth Amendment
guarantees him: constitutionally adequate representation. This doctrinal box
explains why very few cases even address the question whether states'
compensation of appointed counsel can give rise to a constitutional claim." 5
Existing law simply leaves no room for the claim.
Criminal procedure's regulatory system is thus incomplete. It covers the
police in great detail, as it covers some aspects of prosecutors' and trial
judges' conduct in great detail. It also seriously regulates some aspects of
defense counsel behavior; in contrast to the lenity of most ineffective
assistance doctrine, the law governing conflicts of interest has substantial
bite. 79 But the law leaves the level of defense litigation, on which all other
constitutional regulation in this area depends, basically unregulated. Decisions
not to contest plausibly contestable cases, along with decisions not to raise
plausible legal claims, are close to unchallengeable. It goes without saying that
the same has long been true for police and prosecutors: Decisions not to arrest,
not to charge, or to press some charges rather than others are traditionally
unregulated."0
CHANGE 137, 144 (1986).
77. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-96.
78. For notable exceptions, see State v Smith, 681 P2d 1374 (Anz 1984,. and State 1 Pear[. 621
So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). See alao Kennedy v Carlson. 544 N W 2d I (Minn 1996) (holding that a public
defender lacked standing to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to a funding statute while leaving open the
possibility that such a challenge might be valid) A few courts have bypassed ineffective assistance
doctrine, holding that underpaid appointed counsel are the victims of an uncompensated taking of pruperty
See Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991). State ex rel Stephen v Smith. 747 P2d 816 (Kan
1987); State v. Lynch, 796 E2d 1150 (Okla. 1990)
79. See supra note 74; see also Wheat v. Unted States. 486 U S 153 (1988) (holding that a rial court
may disqualify counsel for a conflict of interest against the defendant's wishes)
80. The leading case is hunates of Attica Correctional Faciltv v Rockefeller. 477 F 2d 375 (2d Cir
1973). The tradition of unreviewable arrest and charging discretion is considerably strengthened by
DeShaney v. Winnebago Count), Department of Social Senv'ces. 489 U S 189 (1989). which sharply limits
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
To put the point differently, constitutional criminal procedure defines what
the criminal process looks like, but is agnostic about how much of that process
the system should have-for that is what prosecutors and defense counsel
determine, and that is the aspect of their behavior that the law leaves most to
their discretion. How many cases are prosecuted, how many of those are
contested, and how aggressive are the contests-these issues are left to the
lawyers, subject to essentially no legal regulation.
One might fairly ask, so what? Common law regulation always has this
characteristic. Products liability law alters some manufacturing processes, but
says nothing about how many products are to be manufactured. Indeed, most
legal regulation seeks to limit how certain things are done without limiting
how much of them regulated actors do. The usual and familiar result is that we
get somewhat less of the regulated activity (because regulation makes it more
costly) but what we get is of better quality (assuming the regulation is
sensible). If that were true in this setting, constitutional criminal procedure
would simply mean fewer but fairer arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.
Were that the whole story, it would hardly be worth telling.
But the relationship is more complicated than that, and much more
problematic. Decisions about resources have important feedback effects on
what the system looks like. And what the system looks like-the size and
scope of constitutional criminal procedure-may in turn shape decisions about
resources. To these issues I now turn.
II. How CRIMINAL LITIGATION IS RATIONED
(AND How CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CHANGES IT)
Lawyers always ration legal claims and arguments; that is an important
part of their job. Particular claims cost particular amounts to raise, and each
claim has its own ex ante probability of success. If the market functions as it
should, lawyers raise claims when their ex ante value, measured by their
likelihood of success times the likely payout and subtracting the cost of
litigating the issue, is positive. This process should serve to screen out foolish
arguments while encouraging substantial ones.
Criminal litigation too is rationed, and as elsewhere, the rationing is done
by lawyers. But the rationing is importantly different, for both the prosecution
and the defense. On the government's side, prosecutors are bureaucrats; like
other bureaucrats, their activity level is largely governed by their budgets.
Rationing in this setting is akin to queuing, albeit in a system where the
prosecutor defines one's place in line. On the defense side, a market
mechanism sometimes functions, but the state sets the price through its
appropriations for public defenders' offices or its pay scales for appointed
the scope of constitutional liability for failure by public officials to prevent harm by private actors.
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counsel. These prices are vastly lower than the value of the nonmonetary
sanctions to which defendants are subject. (Who would refuse to pay more
than, say, a thousand dollars to avoid a long prison term, assuming he had
more than a thousand dollars to pay?) The consequence is a strong incentive
to litigate up to the state-set ceiling, but no farther.
Both kinds of rationing shape the effect of legal rules. Because of the path
of American crime rates and because of the way prosecutors and defense
attorneys are paid, the constitutionalized expansion of the law of crinmnal
procedure has probably done more to alter the distribution of criminal
litigation-and hence the distribution of criminal punishment-than its level.
Prosecutors' likely response to more procedural rules is to charge different
cases than they otherwise would, and defense counsel's likely response is to
make different claims. Instead of less-but-better criminal litigation, criminal
procedure may make for equally frequent litigation that is different and, in
some ways, worse.
A. The Prosecution
1. Crime Rates and the Level of Prosecution
Like other govemment agencies, prosecutors' offices operate under a
budget constraint. They also operate under a political constraint: Any
prosecutor's office where everyone works half time while murder cases go
uncharged will soon see a rise in unemployment. The relationship between
those constraints-roughly, the ratio of serious crimes to
prosecutors-determines whether prosecutors are working at anywhere near
capacity. And whether prosecutors are working at capacity, in turn, determines
the effect of legal doctrines that give some criminal defendants litigation
opportunities.
Suppose, for example, that the ratio of crimes to prosecutors is moderately
low; that is, suppose prosecutors have enough time, but only enough time, to
handle all the cases that they both might plausibly win and would want to
win."' In that event, pro-defense changes in the law will lead to less
prosecution. Some cases that were previously winners will become losers, and
some cases that were previously cheap to prosecute will become expensive.
Since prosecutors were using all their time and exhausting their dockets, those
cases will no longer be worth prosecuting. The picture is of a prosecutor with
five "winners" on his desk and just enough time to go forward with all five.
A change in the law that makes one of these five cases unattractive will mean
81. This means only that they will 3pend enough time to win Keep in mind that posmcutor5 hate no
incentive to maximize the amount of time they will spend on work
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filing charges in four cases rather than five-or perhaps litigating all five, but
losing one.
Now suppose the ratio of crimes to prosecutors is much higher; that is,
prosecutors have more strong cases than they have time to pursue those cases.
The same legal change will cost the government little, and the cost will tend
to be hidden. Instead of five winning cases on his desk, the prosecutor now
has ten, with just enough time to go after seven.$2 A legal development that
ruined one of the ten cases for the government would simply mean that the
prosecutor now had to choose seven of nine. There would be some change in
the distribution of cases prosecuted-some movement on the prosecutor's
preference curve away from the kinds of cases in which the particular legal
claim would be most likely to arise. But even that change might be hard to
detect. And overall prosecution and conviction rates might change only
slightly, if at all.
Indeed, the effects of the crime-to-time ratio-the relationship between the
government's litigation opportunities and its litigation resources-almost
certainly dwarf the effects of variations in legal doctrine on both the number
of charges filed and conviction rates. If the crime-to-time ratio is bad enough,
changes in the law will have little or no effect on the size of criminal dockets.
Prosecutors will be able to fill their available time by taking only easy guilty
pleas (making for very high conviction rates). Note how closely some urban
jurisdictions, where this ratio is at its worst, approach this state of affairs: The
percentage of felony convictions obtained by plea has exceeded 97% in some
places, while the nationwide rate is closer to 90%.83
This point is key to understanding the path the law of criminal procedure
has followed over the past thirty-five years. American rates of core serious
crime-major theft offenses plus violent crimes-were historically low in the
1950s and early 1960s, but they rose steeply beginning in about 1962. In 1961,
before this steep rise, the FBI recorded slightly under 2.1 million index crimes;
in 1971 the number was just under six million. 4 The increase continued, but
more slowly; index crimes rose an additional 69% between 1971 and 1990.15
82. I assume that political constraints on prosecutors force them to increase their level of effort
somewhat as caseloads rise; hence the change from five cases exhausting the prosecutor's available time
in the first scenario to seven cases in the second. The point, once again, is that "available" time is likely
to expand somewhat, though it still functions as a constraint.
83. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS-1995, at 498 tbl.5.47 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996) [hereinafter
1995 SOURCEBOOK] (showing a nationwide rate of guilty pleas as a percentage of felony convictions of
92% in 1992), with BARBARA BOLAND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY
ARRESTS, 1987, at 91 (1990) (showing a rate of 96% in Denver), id. at 92 (99% in Littleton, Colorado),
id. at 93 (96% in Los Angeles), id. at 94 (97% in Manhattan, New York City), and id. at 97 (97% in San
Diego).
84. See 1972 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 11, at 61 tbl.2.
85. In the 1970s the method used for calculating the number of index crimes was changed. See FBI,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1973, at 1 (1974). The recalculated 1971 figure was
8.6 million. See 1980 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 10, at 41 tbl.2. By 1990 the number had risen
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The cumulative increase is staggering. In less than three decades, index crimes
nearly quintupled, while the population grew by only one-third.'
Those numbers actually understate the increase in crime, for they do not
include drug offenses. The combination of a substantial increase in some types
of drug crime and a growing public preference for "get-tough" drug policies
led to a large increase in the number of drug prosecutions, especially after the
mid-1970s. Drug arrests more than quintupled between 1968 and 1988, and by
1990, drug cases accounted for one-third of state felony convictions."'
The data on numbers of criminal prosecutors is very sketchy, but that
number has apparently grown a good deal more slowly than the number of
serious crimes, especially if one counts drug offenses. The only available study
that provides nationwide estimates concludes that the number of state and local
assistant prosecutors grew from approximately 17,000 in 1974 to
approximately 20,000 in 1990 8 -not nearly enough to keep up with the
contemporaneous increase in index crimes, much less the increase in drug
crime. Other data suggest a larger increase, but still not large enough. Total
personnel in local prosecutors' and city attorneys' offices grew from 25,954
to 58,408 between 1971 and 1990. 9 Good data on personnel increases in the
1960s do not exist, but it seems likely that much of the growth after 1970 was
an effort to catch up with the 187% increase in index crimes during the
1960s 9-- an increase that surely took legislative budget committees, along
with everyone else, by surprise. Moreover, the personnel increase probably
overstates the growth in the number of prosecutors, since the personnel figures
include city attorneys' offices (the number of employees in prosecutors' offices
alone apparently does not exist for most of the relevant time period). Those
offices experienced a major increase in their workload beginning in the late
1970s. In 1976, Congress passed legislation granting attorneys' fees to
successful civil rights plaintiffs,9 and in 1978, the Supreme Court held that
municipal governments could be sued directly under § 1983. ' Some portion
of the personnel increase is probably a response to those events. Given these
factors, the index-crime-to-prosecutor ratio is almost certainly higher today,
probably by a wide margin, than it was thirty-five years ago. And, again, that
to 14.5 million. See 1991 UNIFORM CRINiE REPORTS, 3upra note 10. at 5
86. In 1961 the American population was close to 184 million, by 1990 it had gro%%n to nearly 250
million. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 3upra note 8, at 8
87. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
88. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. PROSIECUTORS L'- STATE
COURTS-1990, at 1-2 (1992).
89. Compare MICHAEL J. HINDELANG ET AL. U S DEWPT O JUSTICE. SOURCEBOOK OF CRI1ItNAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS-1976, at 73 tbl.1 13 (1977), with 1993 SOURCt-,BOOK, supra note 8. at 32 ib I 25
90. See supra text accompanying note 11.
91. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. Pub L No 94-559.90 Stat 2641 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994)).
92. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.. 436 U S 658 (1978). 5et also 42 U S C § 1983 (1994)
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ratio understates the relevant phenomenon, since index crimes do not include
drug crime, and drug prosecutions grew steeply during the relevant period.
The last three decades' expansion of the law of criminal procedure has
taken place against the backdrop of this rise in prosecutorial budget constraint.
As the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts created new bodies of law
that offered the possibility of new defense claims and arguments, the effect of
those rules was reduced because the constitutional revolution was swamped by
a revolution in the incidence of crime. Given that second revolution, it seems
plausible to suppose that from the late 1960s onward, many more prosecutors
could choose among winners; their level of litigation was much more likely to
be dictated by their budgets than by the set of cases before them. 3 In such
an environment, pro-defense changes in the law would not seem very costly,
since they would neither substantially decrease criminal convictions nor
substantially raise the average cost of prosecution.94 In a low-crime society
(more precisely, a low crime-to-law-enforcement-budget society), the legal
changes that the Warren Court inaugurated might have been very costly
indeed. In the high-crime society we have inhabited since the late 1960s, those
changes appear fairly cheap.
Indeed, the average cost of prosecution has almost certainly fallen during
the period of criminal procedure's vast expansion. That seems odd, for the
many bodies of law the courts have created to regulate criminal investigation
and prosecution are in some sense designed to impose additional costs on the
government. More regulation is supposed to mean higher cost and higher
quality, coupled with lower quantity. But rising crime rates mean more strong
cases, giving police and prosecutors the option of being more selective. The
strength of the marginal case is likely to increase, as is the proportion of cases
that appear to be clear winners for the government, This seems to be what
happened in the 1960s and 1970s: The rate of guilty pleas rose steadily during
that period, even while the law of criminal procedure was imposing ever more
restrictions on police and prosecutors. 5
93. This is one of the lessons of the literature on "net widening." See, e.g., James Austin & Barry
Krisberg, Wider Stronger and Different Nets: The Dialectics of Criminal Justice Refonn, 18 J. RES CRIME
& DELINQ. 165 (1981). Austin and Krisberg point to a number of 1970s-era reform efforts that followed
this pattern: Legislatures created a low-cost case-processing mechanism with the idea of diverting some
offenders from the more expensive prison system; prosecutors then used the low-cost mechanism not to
reallocate existing categories of cases (as intended), but to add new cases to the system-to widen the
system's net. See id. at 169-74. They also note that legislative decriminalization of some kinds of drug and
sex offenses, rather than reducing the number of offenders in the system, freed up officials to pursue other
crimes. See id. at 176-77. Both patterns suggest prosecutors functioning at capacity, with the constraint on
the volume of charges flowing from budgets, not from the number of convictable serious offenders.
94. This point goes far toward explaining Gerald Rosenberg's finding that dramatic changes in the law
of criminal procedure had little practical impact. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 314-35 (1991).
95. In 1962, a sample of 28 counties found a guilty plea rate of 74% for defendants with assigned
counsel and 48% for defendants with retained counsel. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 22-23. By the
mid-1970s, the rate for defendants as a whole had risen significantly, often exceeding 80%. See DAVID A.
JONES, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 44 tbl.4-1 (1979). By 1987, the rate for felonies was 91%-and
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I will return below to how this development may have affected the
Supreme Court and the rest of the appellate court system.' For now, it is
enough to note that the costs of the massive increase in legal regulation of the
criminal process have been hidden by a coincidence. Crime rates took off at
about the same time that the criminal procedure revolution took off. Critics of
the Warren Court tried to claim that the latter phenomenon caused the former,
that higher crime rates were the consequence of changes in constitutional
doctrine. The claim is implausible, as suggested by the past generation's sharp
rise in crime rates elsewhere in the Western world, where Earl Warren's writ
did not run.97 The true causal connection may be close to the opposite of the
one claimed by the Court's conservative opponents. Higher crime rates made
the post-1960 constitutional revolution cheap and therefore, perhaps, palatable.
In another era, one with much less crime, the regime the Supreme Court
created beginning in the 1960s might have come crashing down, defeated by
a public outcry at the spectacle of police and prosecutors sitting on their hands
while large numbers of serious criminals walked away free. In our era, a lot
of criminals may walk away, but no one is sitting on his hands, and even the
police and prosecutors say that constitutional law costs them little." Far from
Earl Warren generating the rise in crime, in all probability the rise in crime has
cemented Warren's work in the law of criminal procedure.
2. Defendants' Wealth and the Cost of Prosecution
The key effect of criminal procedure doctrines on prosecutorial charging
felonies tend to plead at a lower rate than misdemeanors See BOLAND iT AL. iqurCt note 83. at 3
96. See infra Section III.C.
97. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS. CRIME Is NOT "tII: PRUBu'm LI-tMAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 24-29 (1997) (discussing the parallel rise in Ihelt rates in the United States and
other Western countries between 1950 and 1990) As James Q Wilson notes
When the United States experienced the great increase in crime that began in the early
1960's and continued through the 1970's. most Americans 'uere inclined to attibute it to
conditions unique to this country. Many conservatives blamed it on judicial restraints on the
police, the abandonment of capital punishment, and the nmoll~coddling of olienders. many
liberals blamed it on poverty, racism, and the rise of violen television programs
Now, 30 years later, any serious discussion of crime must begin with the lact that. except
for homicide, most industrialized nations have crime rates that resemble those in the United
States.
James Q. Wilson, What To Do About Crine. COmii-NrARY. Sept 1994. at 25
98. An American Bar Association survey, published in 1988. found widespread agreement among
police and prosecutors with the propositon that neither the exclusionary rule nor constitutional limits on
police interrogation impose substantial costs on them. See AM-.RiCAN BAR ASS'N SPCIAL CO.Sit ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 12-20. 28-30. 33 t 1988) Paul Cassell
has criticized the portion of the survey that deals with police views about police intetogation do.trine.
Cassell suggests that the survey understates police opposition to that doctrine See Paul G Ca.ssell. All
Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion ofMiranda3 Defender, 90 Nw U L RI-v 1084. 1109-10 41996)
Even granting Cassell's criticisms, the surprising point is not that some police ofiicers iind Miranda
doctrine objectionable, but that many do not. The ABA survey is fairly posserlul evidence that criminal
procedure's regulated actors, who might be expected to x- unilormly hostile to the regulation. are mostly
indifferent to it.
1997]
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decisions is likely to be distributive: Prosecutors probably do not charge less
because of the law of criminal procedure (at least not much less), but they may
charge differently. The biggest difference is probably an exaggerated class bias.
Developments in the law of criminal procedure over the past three decades
have substantially raised the cost of prosecuting defendants with money.
Clients with the resources to pay for an aggressive defense can take full
advantage of the large bodies of Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment law that govern the criminal process. In a world where defendants
have a high degree of constitutionally protected control over the presentation
of their cases, such clients can also drag out criminal proceedings (including
pretrial proceedings), making prosecution potentially very expensive.
Given the low level of funding of appointed defense counsel, the law of
criminal procedure has a much smaller effect on the cost of prosecuting the
run-of-the-mill armed robbery suspect without the funds to hire a lawyer. That
suspect cannot fully exploit criminal procedure's many rules, because his state-
paid lawyer cannot afford to litigate aggressively enough. For the same reason,
the prosecutor need not fear an O.J. Simpson-style drawn-out proceeding: The
lawyer's resource constraints are too severe-far more so than any limits trial
judges might impose were they free to do so. Constitutional regulation of the
criminal process makes some armed robbery cases unwinnable for the
government, and may make many such cases slightly more expensive. But it
does not make them vastly more expensive.
From the standpoint of prosecutors making charging decisions, it is the
relationship between these two sets of cases that matters, the size of the gap
between the cost of prosecuting the rich and the cost of prosecuting the poor.
Given high crime rates and low pay levels for appointed defense counsel,
criminal procedure makes that gap very large indeed. High crime rates make
for a large supply of easy cases with either appointed counsel or low-paid
private counsel. Low pay rates make those cases cheap to litigate. Thus the
opportunity cost of charging one high-profile well-to-do defendant may be
dozens of burglaries, robberies, and assaults. Of course, sometimes that cost
is worth bearing. Prosecuting an O.J. Simpson or a William Kennedy Smith
is a political imperative. But where it is not imperative, where a prosecutor has
some room for maneuver, the current regime seems designed to encourage her
to substitute poor defendants for rich ones.
A number of phenomena in the system testify to this effect; I will mention
two examples. The first is the rise in the percentage of cases in which defense
counsel is appointed. Two decades ago, attorneys were appointed in less than
fifty percent of criminal cases; today the percentage is eighty.99 Courts
appoint counsel for defendants who are indigent; the percentage of cases in
which courts appoint counsel is thus a decent proxy for the percentage of cases
99. See supra note 7.
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in which the defendant is, by some reasonable measure, poor. And that
percentage has risen sharply over the past couple of decades. This is exactly
what one would expect in a world where the relative cost of prosecuting poor
defendants has declined over time (because the cost of prosecuting rich
defendants has increased so much)."' To be sure, this change may have its
own distinct set of causes; changes in constitutional doctrine are not the only
explanation for the phenomenon. It seems plausible to suppose, however, that
the combination of higher levels of serious crime (which give prosecutors more
flexibility to pick and choose among cases) and heavier constitutional
regulation of the criminal process (which pushes prosecutors toward poorer
defendants) has been a major contributing factor.
The second phenomenon concerns a category of criminal prosecution that
often involves wealthy defendants but that has exploded even as criminal
procedure's constitutional revolution has taken hold. As late as 1970, white
collar crime was a fairly small field.'' Today, there is a large white collar
defense bar in major cities, and some United States Attorneys' offices do an
enormous amount of white collar work.2'- But note where the explosion has
come. White collar crime has not just grown; it has been federalized. The
criminal law of fraud was traditionally a state affair. That kind of white collar
criminal prosecution has been superseded by federal mail and wire fraud
statutes, securities regulation, banking regulation, and the like.
The system's growing wealth bias cannot explain why white collar
criminal enforcement has grown-that phenomenon is probably the product of
other, more political forces-but it can explain why this field has become a
federal enclave. Almost by definition, white collar crime tends to involve
defendants with money.0 3 It also requires investigation of documents and
100. One might respond that the timing is oil, and that the percentage of indigent defendants should
have risen most dramatically in the 1960s, not in the 1970s and 1980s The response is incorrect ior two
reasons. First, the explosion in criminal procedure doctinne is not. as the standard line would hase it. a
function of the 1960s. Most constitutional claims outside the realm of police misconduct stem from legal
developments of the 1970s and 1980s. And even within the realm oi police misconduct. there hae been
major pro-defense developments since 1970 that have generated large numbers oi daims (plus, of Lourse.
the fleshing out of the Warren Court's generalities) See infra notes 211-219 and aC4.ompan)Ing text
The second reason is more general. One would expect that in times of great legal change there would
be some time lag-at least a few years, sometimes a decade or more-between doctrinal deelopments and
the litigation those developments spawn. It takes the legal market time not simpl) to absorb the new
doctrine, but also to absorb its practical impact on litigation strategy That expectaution is especially likely
to hold true of the criminal process, where the relevant litigation decisions are made quickly, in assembly.
line fashion. In such a litigation market, attorney custom is likely to play a po\%eriul role, and custom tends
to change slowly.
101. See, e.g., DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES Tof E ,MIDt)DLE CLASS-S 6-7 (1991)
102. For a good account of the explosion of white collar cnminal practice in New York. with a
particular emphasis on the defense bar, see KENNETH MANN. DHFNtitrNG WHMIE COL..AR CRII 19-30
(1985).
103. This is not to say that white collar cnminal delendants aic invariably rich On the contrary, many
defendants are close to insolvency, which may help explain why the% find crime tempting See WEtsBURD
ET AL., supra note 101, at 65 (noting that many white collar oflenders "hase the material goods associated
with successful people but may barely be holding their financial selves together-) But even it their
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interviews with witnesses that in turn tend to let the defendant know he is a
target. The consequence is often expensive defense maneuvering at the
investigative stage, before charges are even filed." 4 Formal litigation, in
those cases that go to trial, can be more expensive still. For local prosecutors,
the opportunity cost of this kind of litigation tends to be very high: There are
burglaries and rapes and drug deals to prosecute, and those cases cannot
simply be dispensed with, for the local population would not tolerate such a
policy. For federal prosecutors, the calculus is quite different. On the one hand,
federal prosecutors too have a range of cases, many of them easy, that they can
choose to pursue, and an expensive securities fraud case may displace a large
number of these easier cases. On the other hand, federal prosecutors are not
politically accountable to a local population; hence, they can simply dispense
with some important categories of crime to concentrate on others. The
economics of the two prosecutors' offices may be the same, but the politics are
very different.
The point can be generalized. Given high crime rates and a high degree of
constitutional regulation of the criminal process, crimes of the wealthy will
likely become, more and more, a federal affair. That has obviously happened
with offenses like mail fraud, but it extends farther. Federal prosecutors have
played an ever greater role in prosecuting drug cases, but the role has not been
evenly distributed: Large-scale conspiracy charges and prosecutions of high-
level dealers are increasingly the province of federal officials."0 5 Defendants
in these cases often have access to substantial resources, including the
resources of a criminal organization that may be funding the defense. These
are also cases that commonly raise constitutional claims about the gathering of
physical evidence: Most contemporary Fourth Amendment law is made in and
for drug investigations. These features make at least a significant slice of drug
cases-the cases in which defendants can use the proceeds of the business for
their defense-much more expensive for local prosecutors.'"° The natural
response is increasing federalization.
liabilities are substantial, relative to street-crime defendants, white collar defendants' assets are also
substantial. White collar defendants are vastly more likely than are street-crime defendants to be employed,
to be employed in high status professional jobs, to have college degrees, and to own homes. See id. at 64-
65. Not surprisingly, white collar defendants are also much more likely to have privately retained counsel,
though a substantial minority do receive appointed counsel. See id. at 100-01 & tbl.5.2.
104. For a wonderful account, see MANN, supra note 102, passim.
105. From 1982 to 1993, the number of drug trafficking convictions in federal district courts grew
from 5377 to 19,228. See 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 83, at 468 tbl.5.19. One difference between
federal and state drug prosecutions is suggested by a recent study showing that while 70% of defendants
in state court drug prosecutions receive appointed counsel, only 48% of their federal counterparts do. See
Smith & DeFrances, supra note 7, at 3 tbl.4. Presumably this difference Ilows from federal prosecutors'
greater concentration on higher-level defendants, who tend to have more resources.
106. This is so notwithstanding the supposed laxity of Fourth Amendment doctrine in drug cases. The
point is not that drug defendants usually have successful Fourth Amendment claims, but rather that they
sometimes do, and that successful and unsuccessful Fourth Amendment claims alike are disproportionately
located in drug cases.
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There has also been another response. Since the higher cost of prosecuting
stems not only from changes in legal doctrine but also from the defendant's
access to money, the law of criminal procedure gives the government a strong
incentive to try to take away the money. Hence the increased use of state and
federal forfeiture laws as government weapons in criminal litigation."'7 As
in the Caplin & Drysdale case,"'8 the government freezes defense assets that
would otherwise be used to pay lawyers on the ground that those assets are
probably forfeitable, thereby impoverishing the criminal defense." The
statutes that permit this tactic can be seen as legislatures' way of attacking
what is otherwise a large wealth advantage enjoyed by a subset of drug
defendants. The size of that advantage, in turn, has a lot to do with the law of
criminal procedure. Critics of forfeiture proceedings have tended to argue,
plausibly, that those proceedings undermine Sixth Amendment law by reducing
the level of representation available to the defense."" But constitutional law
is itself a major part of the process that has produced forfeiture, because
constitutional law has so increased the gap between the cost of prosecuting the
rich and the cost of prosecuting the poor.
B. The Defense
Now consider the rationing process on the defense side. In one sense, that
process works the same here as anywhere else: Criminal defendants raise
claims if it is worth their while to do so, measured by how costly the claims
are to raise and how likely they are to succeed, and not otherwise. That
proposition, however, masks the role crime rates and resource allocation
decisions play. At least in the many cases where conviction may mean prison,
the stakes in criminal litigation have two critically important characteristics:
They are both extremely large and nonmonetary. The result is a huge wealth
effect. If a given defendant has a million dollars in the bank, he might well
find it worthwhile to spend it all to achieve a successful outcome-hence the
common scenario of white collar defendants impoverishing themselves fighting
off criminal investigation."' But if the same defendant has only one or two
thousand dollars to spend on his defense, the litigation is "worth" one or two
107. The story is told in Pamela S Karlan. Dt~crete and Relational Crunnal Reprrentatton The
Cihanging Viion of the Right to Counael, 105 HARV L REV 670. 703-11 (1992)
108. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 U S 617 (1989)
109. Pamela Karlan has argued that Caphn & D)rdaole can be seen as an elort to thua.t the use ol
criminal defense lawyers to add value to criminal enterprises See Karlan. 3upra note 107. at 710
110. See, e.g., Todd Bamet & Ivan Fox, Trampling on the Strth Amendmcnt 77Te Continud Threat
of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 22 OHIO N U L. REv 1 (1995)
Ill. This phenomenon was at the heart of Congress's decision to authotitc reimburscment ol
attorneys' fees incurred by never-indicted targets ol independent counsel investigations See 28 U S C §
593(0(1) (1993). For a good discussion, see Pamela S Karlan. Contingent Fee and Criminal Caises. 93
COLUM. L. REv. 595, 636-37 & nn,160-62 (1993)
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thousand dollars-even though the potential sanction and the chances of
avoiding it have not changed.
For the roughly eighty percent of defendants who receive appointed
defense counsel, the case is "worth" whatever price the state sets. The state,
in turn, sets that price in a combination of two ways. The first is by funding
public defenders' offices, which are then given all or almost all the indigent
cases in the relevant jurisdiction. The second is by fixing an hourly rate up to
a fee cap for state-funded private counsel." 2 At current funding levels, the
effective price is low under either regime."'
This regime leads to two kinds of biases in the incidence and distribution
of criminal defense litigation. In many, perhaps most cases, the existing
funding system promotes underlitigation, with defense counsel failing to
contest cases as aggressively as they should due to a lack of resources. The
second bias is less obvious but may be more problematic. The current regime
leads to a different mix of litigation, with constitutional claims displacing
factual investigation and argument.
1. Underlitigation
At the outset, one might suppose the existing system produces too much
litigation, not too little. There are some cases in which the proper level of
defense litigation is near zero: The case is easy on the merits, the defendant
admits guilt, there are no apparent constitutional claims, and the prosecution
has offered substantial sentencing concessions. In a system with state-paid
counsel, defendants may contest these cases too aggressively. A defense
attorney gets paid whether she wins or loses, and since the pay does not come
from the client, the client does not mind litigation that wastes the prosecutor's
and the court's time. This is presumably part of the reason why states have
low fee caps for separately appointed defense counsel. The fear is that counsel
has no reason apart from the cap to stop litigating. The result, one might think,
is a regime with too much litigation in easy cases and too little in hard cases.
There Fare, however, a variety of reasons to discount the "too much"
problem. Since fee caps are low, cases taken to trial tend to be money losers.
By refusing to make plea concessions, prosecutors often can, in effect, force
defense counsel to take cases to trial. Of course, the prosecutor loses when this
happens, but defense counsel loses more, particularly since the prosecutor has
an option defense counsel does not have: She can get rid of some cases to
make room for others; that is, she can control the size of her docket. For
112. A third, less common, method is to contract with firms or individual lawyers for representation
of a class of indigent defenders. For a recent survey of methods of assignment and funding, see Robert L.
Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systeim in the United States, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., winter 1995, at 31, 32-53.
113. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
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defense counsel, the size of the docket is more like an external constraint This
asymmetry creates something like a chicken game between a Lexus and a
Hyundai. Both sides are harmed by the collision, but one is harmed much
more, and the side with more to lose is in the weaker negotiating position.
Prosecutors' ability to threaten loss is thus a useful tool for punishing
overlitigation by appointed counsel and hence for inducing more cooperative
(meaning less litigious) behavior. The plea bargaining literature contains some
anecdotal evidence that prosecutors behave in precisely this fashion-
Then too, hourly rates for appointed counsel are, in many jurisdictions, less
than generous. 5 Even for lawyers who enjoy little financial success, these
rates may be no greater than the opportunity cost of the lawyer's time. Finally,
the incentive to overlitigate is basically absent in cases involving public
defenders. Their compensation is not limited in any given case; it is limited
across a set of cases. Consequently, public defenders must ration their time
across the board; the marginal benefit of investments in any given case is not
discontinuous, as it is for separately appointed counsel subject to fee caps. All
of which suggests that, given existing conditions, the degree of overlitigation
must be very small." 6
The more serious problem is too little litigation. Appointed defense counsel
litigate less than high-end private counsel because they cannot afford to do
otherwise. The resulting shortage of litigation takes three forms. First and most
obviously, defense counsel sometimes press their clients to plead guilty, since
taking a high percentage of cases to trial is unaffordable."' The second form
shows up in those cases that do go to trial: Even where charges are contested,
the contest is less aggressive than it would be if defense counsel were funded
114. See, e.g., HErMANN, supra note 76, at 122-26
115. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text
116. Of course, in different conditions overlittgation might be J greater conem I lee caps and hourl,
rates were much higher, separately appointed counsel's incentive to litigate would also be inmuh higher, and
prosecutors' ability to induce cooperative nonlitigatton would be reduced At Current pi1) rates, hoste.er.
overlitigation seems to be a minor problem even for that subset oi appointed detense tounsel Fur public
defenders, one might suppose that overliigation would remain a small problem esen it funding scre
dramatically increased. Because they are salaried employees, public delenders gain nothing from the
marginal hour in court, and they lose an hour that could be spent somewhere else
117. This point is barely acknowledged in the recent outpounng of literature on apxintcd delense
counsel, presumably because counsel themselves tend not to ackno%%ledge it Cf MCL','tRI-. supra note
22, at 154-56 (reporting that some public defenders conceded pressing clients to plead guilty, but denied
that this behavior was the result of docket pressure) But delendants do See ROB-MRT lit-tRmANN t-T AL.
COUNSEL FOR THE POOR: CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN URBAN APMERICA 47. 51. 94 (1977) (citing eidente ot
defendants' perceptions that public defenders pressure them to plead guilty). , Schulhoter & Fredman.
supra note 32, at 86 (discussing defendants' perception that public delender are part of the juditcal
bureaucracy).
The tendency to push for guilty pleas as a response to resou.e constraints is one of the primar)
sources of academic attacks on plea bargaining See. e g . Stephen J Schulhoter. Plea Bargitciuig to
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1988-90 (1992) Yet the problem is not plea barganing but the resour.e
constraints. The pressure to plead would exist even it prosecutors sere forbidden to ofter explitit
concessions, as long as defense attorneys faced severe cost pressures
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more generously. Resources limit the time invested in selecting a jury, the
number of witnesses called, and the lines of factual argument pursued."'
Third, resources limit constitutional litigation. The regulatory provisions
of the law of criminal procedure presuppose that defense counsel will object
when constitutional violations occur. That is how regulated actors-chiefly, but
not solely, the police-receive the signal that they need to adjust their
behavior. Resource constraints impose a ceiling on how many things counsel
can object to, how many claims can plausibly be raised. The result is that
claims must cross a higher threshold in order to get appointed counsel to raise
them, or raise them aggressively.'19
Of course, less litigation is not the same as too little litigation. Perhaps,
one might argue, the current system is wise to ration so severely. The large
majority of defendants presumably are guilty, and many of them will have no
plausible legal claims. The system would do well to focus its attention on the
most problematic cases. On this view, we have created a system with great
litigation opportunities coupled with serious resource constraints in order to
ensure that the opportunities are used wisely, that litigation dollars are spent
on the strongest claims for the most deserving defendants.
That argument is hard to answer in the abstract. One's conclusion depends
on how much defense litigation one thinks appropriate, and the right baseline
is not obvious. But comparing cases with and without appointed counsel is
118. These statements are obviously true, yet evidence for them is hard to come by. The reason, its
Malcolm Feeley has noted, is that the literature tends to compare appointed counsel to all retained counsel
rather than to well-paid retained counsel. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Bench Trials, Adversariness, and Plea
Bargaining: A Cotnent on Schulhofer's Plan, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 174 (1986). It is
probably the case that most retained counsel are retained by defendants whose finances place them only
slightly above the indigency line. Often such counsel do no better-indeed, may do worse-than the
counsel indigents receive. See, e.g., JAMEs EISFNSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS Of JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES
AND THEIR COURTS 289 (1988). But cf infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text (noting evidence that,
on some measures, retained counsel litigate more aggressively and achieve better results).
Feeley concludes that worrying about the level of resources for criminal defense is largely beside the
point, for "it is unrealistic to expect that public sector services for the indigent-including criminal
defendants-will ever be much better than what is available in the market to those who can barely pay for
services." Feeley, supra, at 174-75. The upshot, he says, is that we cannot substantially improve the lot of
indigents in the existing system without socializing criminal defense. See id. at 175. This is incorrect. Were
the state to fund criminal defense substantially better, it would presumably raise the indigency bar
accordingly-indigency logically ought to depend on whether a defendant could purchase a level of
representation comparable to what the state gives those with no money. Cf Donna L. Hall & Jonathan E.
Gradess, Determining Client Eligibility for Appointed Counsel: A Strategy for Reform in New York State,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 119 (1986) (describing and criticizing the existing system by which
indigency is defined). It seems to follow that more money for criminal defense would mean more indigent
defendants. But there is a counter-tendency: More money for criminal defense would reduce the gap
between the cost of prosecuting defendants with and without resources, which would reduce the
government's incentive to prosecute poorer defendants. See supra Section II.A. Over time, then, the
percentage of indigents might actually go down in a better-funded system. It is precisely the poverty of
criminal defense in the existing system that pushes toward a socialized system; better funding might have
the opposite tendency.
119. See, e.g., Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York
City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 766-69 (1986-1987) (summarizing evidence of the failure
of appointed defense counsel in New York to engage in substantial motions practice).
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instructive. When defendants do have resources, they spend them. The result
is higher levels of litigation among those who can hire lawyers than among
those who must take what the state gives them. Privately paid counsel file
more motions than do state-appointed counsel. 0 Defendants with private
counsel see their lawyers sooner than do those with appointed counsel.
When they plead guilty, defendants who hire their own lawyers do so later,
after the lawyers have had more opportunity to investigate the case.'2 And
though early studies showed that defendants with retained and appointed
counsel had similar outcomes,12 1 some more recent studies suggest that
defendants with retained counsel do significantly better.12- These effects
presumably grow as the level of resources available to pay counsel grows:
Consider the length of, and attorney investment in, trials like O.J. Simpson's.
If defendants who can afford to hire counsel litigate properly, it follows that
indigent defendants do not litigate enough.
2. Differently Distributed Litigation
a. Why Some Claims Displace Others
Thus far the argument has suggested, unrelnarkably, that poorly funded
appointed counsel will litigate a lot less than well-funded private counsel. The
120. See Pauline Houlden & Stephen Balkin, Quahr and Cost Coinparrions of Periate Bar huligent
Defense Systems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned Counsel. 76 J CRIMI L & CRLMiLNOL(O. 176. 1W t l95)
121. A survey of inmates of local jails indicated that 69'% of those who hired a la%.)et had met ssith
her within a week after detention, compared to 47'7 of those %\ho received state-appointed Counsel See
Smith & DeFrances, supra note 7. at 4 tbl 7
122. See HANSON ET AL., supra note 22. ait 43-44 (reporting that. in a stud of time courts in
communities of varying sizes, the average number of days from charging to adjudication %%as 103 in cases
with assigned counsel, 128 in cases with public defenders, and 160 in cases with retained counscl. Pauline
Houlden & Steven Balkin, Costs antd Qualir of hidigent Defense Ad Hoc % Cvodinated A3srgnniirnt of
the Private Bar Witiin a Mixed Sy stem:, 10 JUST SYS J 159, 165 (1985) (reporting the results of a stud)
showing similar results of 105.7 days for ad hoc assigned counsel and 120 3 dajs for retained counscl)
123. See Floyd Feeney & Patrick G Jackson. Public Defender3. Aisgned Coarsel, Retained Counaiel
Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?. 22 RLrrGi S L J 361. 365-78 (199) (discussing prc-
1980 studies).
124. See Dean J. Champion, Pro ate Counsels and Pubhc Defenders A Look at l'eak Care3 Prior
Records, and Leniency in Bargaintg, 17 J. CRIrt JUST 253. 258 (19891 (reporting that retaned iounsel
are more likely to take cases to trial and more likely to obtain acquittals). Stesens H Clarke & Susan T
Kurtz, The Irnportance of Interan Decisions to Feloni Trial Court Dispot i o. 74 J Camis L &
CRIMINOLOGY 476, 507 (1983) (finding that retained counsel are more likel) to obtain dismissal and that
their clients are more likely to avoid prison sentences in nonviolent felony cases). Joyce S Sterling.
Retained Counsel Versus the Public Defender: The Impact of Tipe of Counsel on Charge Barganing. in
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 151, 160-62 (William F McDonald ed. 1983) (stating that retained counsel ate
more likely to obtain deferred disposition or charge reduction)
The gap between retained and appointed counsel would no doubt be larger but for the fact that a
significant portion of retained counsel are paid either no better or onl) slightl) better than appointed
counsel. See EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 118. at 289 For example. when white collar defendants. wsho
are likely to exceed the indigence threshold by a substantial margin, arc compared with ordinary street-
crime defendants, the large majority of whom are either indigent or close to it, a substantial gap in the rate
of guilty pleas appears. See WEISBURD ET AL. supra note 101. at 113-14 (finding that white c~ollar
defendants go to trial four times as often as defendants in street-crime cases)
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more interesting and more disturbing possibility is that appointed counsel will
litigate differently. Imagine two civil defendants, both sued for $50,000, one
of whom has privately paid counsel while the other is given state-appointed
counsel paid a modest hourly fee up to a $2000 cap. Three different legal
defenses are potentially available to these civil defendants. Any of the defenses
would win the case if successful; each is independent of the others; each costs
$1000 to raise; and each has a 10% chance of success. In this scenario, the
defendant with private counsel will press all three claims, while his counterpart
will litigate only two.
Now add another piece to the puzzle: Suppose the relevant jurisdiction has
just generated a new defense claim. It too costs $1000 to litigate, but it has a
slightly higher chance of success-say, 15%. The richer defendant will now
raise four claims rather than three. The poorer defendant will substitute the
new claim for one of the others, thereby slightly raising his likelihood of
success. But he will still raise only two claims.
Note the effect of the new claim. For the defendant with resources, it
raises the level of litigation, since the stakes make it worthwhile to use all
weapons the law might make available. For the poorer defendant, the stakes
are not the decisive factor; the attorney's fee is. Consequently, for that
defendant, the legal change alters the distribution of defense litigation but not
its level.
The picture is of an archery contest where each contestant is given three
arrows and three shots at the target. Just before the contest is to begin, all the
contestants receive three more arrows. But while a few contestants are, like the
rich defendant, allowed to fire all the arrows they have, the large majority must
still make do with only three shots. For most contestants, more ammunition
does not mean more shots fired, and (depending on the difference in quality
of the arrows) it may have only a slight effect on how particular contestants
perform. Its primary effect may be to change which arrows contestants pull
from their quivers.
That is a fairly accurate picture of criminal litigation and its relationship
to changes in the law of criminal procedure. For defense attorneys paid at an
hourly rate up to a low fee cap, the picture captures attorneys' litigation
incentives quite well. For public defenders the story is more complicated,
though the essential point remains the same. Recall that salaried public
defenders, like prosecutors, must ration their time across a set of cases. If the
set is large enough (as it appears to be in most public defenders' offices), the
level of litigation is essentially at capacity. Additional claims and arguments
in one case must mean less aggressive litigation somewhere else. Once again,
the prime effect of more constitutional regulation is not so much to increase
the level of litigation as to change its distribution. Some claims displace others.
It follows that, given anything like the current allocation of funds to the
system, constitutional law faces a different set of choices than the ones usually
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discussed in Supreme Court opinions and law review articles. The question is
not whether greater regulation of jury selection or police searches and seizures
is a good thing in itself, but whether it is worth some loss of enforcement of,
say, Miranda or double jeopardy law. Given the enforcement regime,
defendants' rights are in competition with each other.
In itself, that is not necessarily a large problem. It is not obvious that the
system does or should have strong preferences among various criminal
procedure claims. Encouraging litigants to select among possible claims based
on the cost and strength of each claim may be sensible. To be sure, the
presence of tradeoffs between different claims may say something about the
regulatory weight the system can carry. One might value Miranda, search and
seizure law, double jeopardy law, and Batson doctrine equally, yet still prefer
aggressive enforcement of any two of these bodies of law to low-level
enforcement of all four. But one might also have the opposite preference
Large numbers of potential claims coupled with severe resource constraints
may allow the law to regulate a wide variety of areas without having the
system grind to a halt.
The real problem with the archer), contest stems from the possibility that
some arrows are special, that some claims matter more than others, If, for
example, we should prefer the marginal valid Miranda claim to the marginal
valid grand jury discrimination claim, or vice versa, the competition among
claims becomes a serious issue.
b. Procedural Claims and Factual Claims
Enter merits litigation. One kind of argument defense counsel can make
on behalf of her client goes to whether the client, in fact, committed the cnime
charged. Perhaps the defendant has an alibi, or acted in self-defense, or lacked
the requisite mens rea. Those arguments do matter more than other sorts of
arguments raised in criminal litigation; most people would agree that the
system should seek to minimize convictions of innocent defendants. This
preference for skewing the risk of error in the defendant's favor does not apply
to most constitutional claims, where the system can tolerate a much higher
level of pro-govemment error: Better that an occasional Fourth Amendment
violation or Batson claim be overlooked than that an occasional innocent
defendant be imprisoned. This explains the system's different rules on burdens
of proof: Guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, ' 5 but
exclusionary rule claims (for example) are often rejected unless the defendant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was illegal."
125. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
126. The standard rule in search and seizure cases is that the defendant bears the burten of prosing
that a "search" or "seizure" took place; at that point, the burden of proving reasonableness shifts to the
government if the search or seizure was warrantless. but the burden ren.ins on the delendant it the police
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Crucially, though, satisfying these common preferences concerning the
distribution of errors on different kinds of claims also requires adequate levels
of litigation in the respective categories. If marginal search and seizure claims
tend to be raised while marginal merits claims are not, the error rates in the
two categories will have the wrong relationship. Too many innocents will be
convicted, not because their arguments are pressed unsuccessfully, but because
those arguments are never raised. And, perhaps, too many marginal search and
seizure claims will succeed-again, not because courts are too favorable
toward such claims, but because too many are litigated.
To some degree, the current system encourages that result. Consider the
relative cost of raising a search and seizure claim and a self-defense argument.
The search and seizure claim has many advantages. Such claims are easy to
raise; counsel need only file a boilerplate motion. The facts on which they rest
usually do not involve much independent digging by defense counsel. The
typical suppression hearing is nothing more than an adjudication of the
plausibility and legality of the police officer's version of events. This
adjudicative process requires neither detailed papers nor a complicated jury
proceeding, merely a brief hearing with one or two witnesses before a
judge.' 27 And the benefits of a successful claim are sometimes enormous-it
can mean dismissal of all charges. Even where that is not the case (as it often
is not),128 suppressing some evidence can bring about a charge reduction and
a more favorable plea bargain. This leads to one final, critically important
point about the cost of invoking the exclusionary rule: One can file and litigate
suppression motions without going to trial. The system is designed to facilitate
fast-track pretrial litigation that can then set the stage for either dismissal or
a plea agreement, precisely the kind of process that is least expensive for
overburdened defense counsel to invoke.
The self-defense claim, meanwhile, will likely involve substantial digging.
Among other things, counsel will have to investigate in detail any prior
relationship between the victim and the defendant, since that relationship will
acted pursuant to a warrant. In addition, defendants bear the burden of establishing both standing to raise
a Fourth Amendment claim and the causal connection between the asserted constitutional violation and the
discovery of evidence. See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 11.2(b), at 37-57.
127. Sometimes no papers need be filed; an oral motion will suffice. Cf. 2 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM,
TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 222(A), at 3-4 (1989) (advising defense counsel
to submit a written motion even where an oral motion is permitted). Interestingly, the leading defense trial
manual advises counsel to keep suppression motions spare in order to avoid giving police information about
the defendant's legal theory. See id. § 222(B)(2)-(3), at 4-5. The same manual, in discussing the
presentation of evidence at suppression hearings, focuses on the testimony of the arresting officer and the
defendant, see id. § 253(E), at 169-72, presumably because most suppression hearings involve testimony
from no one else.
128. The link between suppressing evidence and dismissal depends on the kind of evidence suppressed.
Peter Nardulli's study of exclusionary rule litigation in Chicago found that the vast majority of successful
motions to suppress physical evidence resulted in dismissal or acquittal, while the conviction rate dropped
by less than one-third when incriminating statements were suppressed. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal
Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Reviited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 233.
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tend to determine the plausibility of any claim that the victim was the true
aggressor. It is also costlier to pursue than the Fourth Amendment claim. If the
government fights the suppression motion, the upshot is a brief suppression
hearing; if the government fights a self-defense argument, the upshot is a jury
trial, and jury trials are more involved and require more preparation than
suppression hearings. And the self-defense claim is generically no more likely
to succeed. Defendants win about one-sixth of contested suppression
motions; 129 the acquittal rate for felonies that go to trial is similar."'
That much suggests a substantial incentive on the part of defense counsel
to prefer some kinds of procedural litigation to some kinds of merits litigation.
Of course, other incentives operate: A successful merits claim usually leads to
complete victory,' while a successful suppression motion often does not.
Moreover, the successful merits claim may offer more satisfaction to defense
counsel than victory via Fourth Amendment litigation. Counsel have other
motivations besides minimizing cost; many public defenders have their jobs
precisely because of their desire to prevent serious injustices. That desire, one
might suppose, would counterbalance the cost differences that seem to tilt
against factual arguments on the merits.
Yet even if this is so, 32 defense counsel are rarely put in the position of
129. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the ErclutonaOr Rule: An Empincal Assesrnent, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 590, 596 (finding a success rate of 16 9% on motions to suppress physical
evidence in a study of nine counties). One might fairly ask why this percentage is so high In economic
terms, defense counsel have an incentive to invest in claims until their marginal return is equal to the
marginal return of alternative investments. Given the low cost of suppression hearings relative to trials. that
should produce a mix of litigation that is tilted heavily toward suppression motions-lawyers should be
much more willing to press low-probability Fourth Amendment claims than low-probability merits claims
The rough equivalence of success rates at trial and in suppression hearings suggests this does not happen
There are two likely explanations. First, suppression motions are less likely to produce total victory
than are trial defenses--that is. even successful Fourh and Fifth Amendment claims often produce
convictions on some charge, see supra note 128, while successlul claims on the merits generally lead to
a dismissal or an acquittal. Second, defense attorneys and prosecutors are repeat players in the plea
bargaining process, and prosecutors have both the incentive and the ability to puntsh what they see as
excessive pretrial litigation by defense attorneys See HhU.IANN, 3upra note 76. at 131-38 Defense
attorneys who make a habit of filing one-in-a-hundred suppression motions will find, in many jurisdictions.
that their clients do not receive the charging and sentencing concessions that other delendants get
130. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supro note 8, at 546 tl 5 73 (linding in a survey o1 the nation's 75
largest counties that 6% of all defendants are convicted of felonies at trial while 1% of all defendants are
acquitted). An earlier study, closer in time to Nardulli's study of suppression motions. see Nardulli, supra
note 129, found 5% of all defendants convicted of felonies at trial and 1% aLquitted See BURi-.AU O-
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. SOURCEBOOK ON CRImtNAL JUSTIch-1989. at 525 itl 5 50
(Timothy J. Hanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1990).
131. Usually, but not always. Successful mens rea arguments can reduce the grade of olfense without
leading to nonliability, as where a murder charge leads to a manslaughter conviction Imperfect self-defcnse
and provocation claims function the same way. These kinds of merits arguments have results analogous
to successful suppression motions that remove some. but not all. of the government's case. and thereby set
the stage for a more favorable plea bargain.
132. It may not be. Far from counteracting the cost differences, the culture of criminal defense counsel
may reinforce them. In part because so many of their clients are certain to lose, public defenders have long
seen themselves not as defending the innocent or helping the system separate the innocent from the guilty,
but as fighting the system, gaining victories (whole or partal) as often as possible and :n any (legal) way
possible. See, e.g., HERANN ET AL., supra note 117, at 85 (discussing a 1970s study of cniminal defense
counsel noting that New York City Legal Aid lawyers were criticized for trying to -fight the system and
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choosing whether to file this suppression motion or raise that factual
claim-the kind of choice that would highlight the tradeoff between merits and
non-merits litigation. The far more common choice is whether to file the
motion or investigate the factual claim. Factual arguments are not merely
harder to prepare and pursue than legal claims; they are harder to evaluate.
And quick evaluation is key. In a system in which ninety-plus percent of
convictions are by guilty plea'33 and in which public defenders represent
hundreds of felony defendants per year, 134 defense lawyers' most important
job is triage: deciding which (few) cases to contest somewhat, which (very
few) cases to contest seriously, and which ones not to contest at all. Nor can
clients be trusted to sort themselves: If it is worthwhile for defendants to claim
innocence, all will do so. 135 In such a world, factual arguments-claims that
the defendant did not do the crime, or acted in self-defense, or lacked the
requisite mens rea-tend to require nontrivial investigation simply to establish
whether there is any argument to make. Most possible challenges to the
legality of a police search, meanwhile, appear on the face of the police report.
(If the police searched the defendant's house, did they get a warrant? If they
discovered drugs in the course of a traffic stop, was the stop justified?)
The relevant choice, therefore, is not whether to file a suppression motion
or make a self-defense argument, but whether to file the motion or find out if
the argument even exists, in a world where it probably doesn't. Given how
cheap is the process that decides the suppression motion, and given the
expense of both determining whether the self-defense argument is worth
making and actually taking that argument to trial, the system places substantial
pressure on counsel to opt for the procedural claim rather than the (potential)
substantive one.
This point extends beyond Fourth Amendment claims and self-defense
arguments. In general, arguments about the merits of criminal charges are fact-
intensive and hence require significant investigation even to determine whether
make a statement" or wage "personal warfare against the system"). For a more recent study that reaches
a similar conclusion, see Debra S. Emmelman, Defending Indigents: A Study of Criminal Defense Work
30, 367 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (San Diego)) (on file with the Yale
Law School Library). For a defense of this "fight the system" mentality, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERs AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-65 (1988). This psychology is probably inevitable and it may be, on
balance, socially beneficial. But it pushes defenders to think of suppression motions and self-defense claims
as substitutes-different tools toward the same end. Society no doubt has a rank ordering in mind, with
some kinds of defense victories strongly preferred to others. Defense counsel may not share the same
vision, and their natural incentive is to value all victories equally.
133. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
135. This is presumably why criminal defense counsel report a high level of dishonesty among their
clients. Milton Heumann quotes the following statement of a state court criminal defense attorney: "[Tlhe
first year you practice law you believe everything your client tells you. The second year you practice, you
believe everything that the other side tells you. The third year you don't know who's telling the truth. Most
people tend not to believe their clients that much, justifiably." HEUMANN, supra note 76, at 59. For a
discussion of the problem this sort of client dishonesty creates for plea bargaining, see Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1935-49 (1992).
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the argument is worth raising, and such investigation is costly, especially in a
regime with severe resource constraints. Some constitutional claims require
factual investigation as well (think of grand jury discrimination claims 3'),
but most do not (consider most challenges to the jury selection process'"),
and those that do require some digging rarely require much (as with police
interrogation or search and seizure claims, where adjudication often turns on
the testimony of the police officer and oral argument by the attorneys). Finally,
as with search and seizure claims, a large number of constitutional claims can
be raised in low-cost pretrial motions that tend to serve as preludes to either
dismissal or a plea. Factual claims are placed on a much costlier litigation
track. These differences give constitutional litigation a major cost advantage
over most kinds of challenges to the merits of criminal charges.
None of this means there is a one-to-one displacement of merits arguments
by procedural claims. On the contrary: One can file and litigate several
suppression motions in the time it takes to prepare and try one felony case. But
there is some displacement, and its effects may well be large, if only because
the number of procedural claims is so large. 31 Peter Nardulli's famous study
from the early 1980s showed suppression motions filed in 11% of felony
cases.' 39 Roughly contemporaneous data showed 9% of felony arrests that
lead to indictment going to trial, and only 6% of felony arrests for which some
charges are filed going to trial.'" If any significant portion of time spent on
suppression motions otherwise would be spent on investigation, some of which
presumably would lead to trials, abolition of the exclusionary rule would lead
to a significant increase in the trial rate.
In short, constitutional law has gone some distance toward proceduralizing
criminal litigation, and this proceduralization tends, at the margin, to reduce
136. Such claims tend to require a great deal ol inlormation both about hov, other grand junes have
been selected and about the demographics of the local population See, e g . Castaneda v Partida. 430 U S
482, 486-88, 494-96 (1977),
137. Since Bat~on v Kentucky, 476 U S 79 (1986), objecttons to the go,.ernment's use ot peremptory
challenges require no more than what delense counsel knows Irom sitting in the toursroom when the
relevant challenges were made. See id. at 96.
138. This is a controversial statement; the leading work on the empincs o the exclusionary rule
concludes that the number of claims is surprtstngly anall See Nardulli. 3upra note 129. at 606 r"lilt seems
clear that the exclusionary rules .. have a truly marginal ellect on the criminal court system") As
always, one's conclusion depends on one's baseline. Exclusionary rule litigation is rare in the sense that
all criminal litigation is rare--the huge majority of convictions are obtained by guilty plea. and in most ol
those cases there is, basically, no litigation at all For a discussion of one study that makes the point nicely.
see infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text. On the other hand. it one compares the inciden c ol
suppression motions to the incidence of cnminal trials, the former number looks quite large See infra notes
139-140 and accompanying text. Resource constraints place a very low ceiling on criminal litigation Within
the fairly small universe of cases that generate claims o1 any sort. procedural claims. including xclusionary
rule claims, loom larpe.
139. See Nardulh, supra note 129. at 593-94. Unusually high numbers from one jundition may have
distorted this figure; with that jurisdiction excluded the number was approximately 8.-still higher than
the trial rate. See id. at 594. Nardulli's later study ol exclusionary rule litigation in Chicago found
suppression motions filed in approximately 10% of cases See Nardulli. supra note 128. at 228
140. See BOLAND Er AL., supra note 83, at 6-7 tbls 3, 4
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defense litigation of the merits. That claim is hard to prove (or disprove), but
it does square with a variety of aspects of the current system. In their thorough
study of appointed counsel in New York City,'4' Michael McConville and
Chester Mirsky found low levels of both factual investigation and motions
practice. The levels were not, however, equally low. So-called "18-B Panel
Attorneys," private lawyers assigned criminal cases, visited the crime scene in
12% of homicide cases (4% for other felonies) and interviewed witnesses in
21% of homicide cases and 4% of other felony cases.'4 2 Use of experts was
similarly rare, occurring in 17% of homicide cases and only 2% of other
felony cases.'43 Written motions were filed, meanwhile, in approximately
26% of homicide cases and 11% of other felony cases.'"
The picture McConville and Mirsky paint is of a regime in which most
cases receive almost no investment of attorney time and energy; resource
constraints presumably make such an investment impossible. 45  In the
universe of cases in which attorneys do invest, pretrial motions practice leading
to dismissal or negotiated settlement-the kind of process used for adjudicating
almost all Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims and some Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims-is common. Homicide cases aside, factual investigation
is exceptional. Even in homicide cases, motions practice seems to take
precedence over factual inquiry. In a world in which defense attorney time is
scarce, these activities must, to some degree, be substitutes for one another.
And the greater the resource constraints placed on defense counsel, the higher
the likely ratio between time spent on motions practice and time spent on
investigation, because investigation is so much more expensive.
A parallel phenomenon exists in criminal appeals, as any scan of reported
state court appellate decisions will show. Forty years ago, appellate opinions
in criminal cases tended to focus on challenges to jury instructions and claims
141. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 119.
142. See id. at 762.
143. See id. at 764.
144. See id. at 767.
145. McConville and Mirsky contend that resource constraints are part of a larger picture of
nonadversarial criminal defense, with "those in control of indigent defense want[ingJ low-cost, efficient
processing of criminal defendants through guilty pleas and other non-trial dispositions." Id. at 582. This
claim is similar to the hypothesis that appointed defense counsel function as case-processing bureaucrats
closely allied to the prosecutors and courts, rather than as advocates for defendants-a hypothesis that used
to be common in the social science literature but is now generally rejected. See, e.g., HANSON ET AL., supra
note 22, at 66-69 (discussing and criticizing this view); MCINTYRE, supra note 22, at 46-49 (same).
The more plausible claim is that defense counsel do function as advocates, but only very selectively,
because resource constraints make a more aggressive course impossible. Lisa McIntyre's excellent book
on Chicago public defenders notes that the defenders see themselves as, and function as, adversarial
litigants. See MCINTYRE, supra note 22, at 148-50. Yet McIntyre also notes that new public defenders
receive essentially no training, apparently because caseloads make training impossible. See id. at 102-04.
(One lawyer described his early days in the public defender's office as follows: "I had a partner for one
week and then I was put on my own. It was crazy, we used to do fifteen bench trials a day and I had, on
the average, forty clients a day." Id. at 103.) Finally, McIntyre notes that defenders pushed clients to plead
guilty with some frequency. See id. at 154-56. These findings suggest that resources constrain litigation
more than does any native disposition toward cooperation.
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that the proof of guilt was insufficient. Today, appellate opinions contain much
less discussion of these sorts of claims; the dominant focus is on search and
seizure, police interrogation, jury selection, and the like.' If reported
decisions are a fair guide, appellate criminal litigation is criminal procedure
litigation. Again, part of the reason is the cost advantage constitutional claims
enjoy. That advantage extends beyond defense lawyers. Appellate judges can
do a good job of deciding Fourth or Fifth Amendment claims by reading
briefs. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments are harder to evaluate. They
require more familiarity with the record, which in turn requires a greater
judicial investment in the case. This difficulty probably leads to greater judicial
receptivity to legal claims than to factual ones (that certainly seems consistent
with the reported decisions), which only tends to reinforce defense attorneys'
incentive to skew their investment in the direction of more constitutional
litigation and less litigation about the facts.
Finally, a similar phenomenon may help to explain current perceptions of
capital punishment litigation. Constitutional law has regulated such litigation
extensively, and the regulation has focused almost exclusively on process." 7
All this procedural Eighth Amendment law has generated a large number of
claims, especially on appeal and habeas corpus, and the claims have been
surprisingly successful-for a time, capital murder defendants enjoyed a more
than fifty percent success rate in federal habeas corpus litigation. I4 8 Yet in
the face of all this procedural litigation, there remains a widespread distrust of
the system's outcomes, a conviction that we are sentencing the wrong people
to death. As Carol and Jordan Steiker have noted,"4 9 this situation breeds two
opposite criticisms of the current system of capital punishment: One side says
the system is overregulated, that Eighth Amendment law is paralyzing (as
shown by the volume of litigation and the long delays that attend executions),
and the other says it is underregulated, that the law does not adequately guard
against unfair outcomes (as shown by studies suggesting a bias against killers
of white victims,' 50 and also by the disturbingly frequent Thin Blue Line-type
cases' s' of convicted capital murder defendants subsequently shown to be
probably innocent 152). Steiker and Steiker contend that both sets of critics
146. I am aware of no systematic study of this point. it rests only on my own obser'ations from
reading reported cases.
147. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Stetker, Sober Second Thoughts" Reflections on Tho Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punislunent, 109 HARV L REV 355 passun (1995)
148. See Donald P. Lay, Thre Writ of Habeas Corpus A Complex Procedure for a Sunple Process. 77
MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1044 n.166 (1993) (collecting sources)
149. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 147, at 358-59
150. For the most famous study, see David Baldus el at . Conparative Revieu of Death Sentences
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience. 74 J CRtt L & CRIMINOLOGY 661 t1983)
151. See THE THIN BLUE LINE (Miramax Films 1988) (documenting a case in which a defendant was
convicted and sentenced to death notwithstanding substantial doubt about his guilt)
152. See Hugh Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, MiAcarrages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 38 tbl.4 (1987) (finding 17 such cases in the 1970s and early 1980s). see also
EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTE.D BY JURI.S. EXONhRATED BY SCIENCE.
The Yale Law Journal
have a point, largely because the Supreme Court has paid too little attention
to regulating substantive outcomes.1
53
Steiker and Steiker have it right. But the problem goes deeper. It is not
only that constitutional law has been too loath to regulate substance in the law
of capital punishment. The point is that heavy procedural regulation has tended
to drive substance away. In murder cases as elsewhere, arguments on the
merits are costly, and the cost must be borne at the initial stages of the
litigation: Witnesses must be interviewed and evidence must be marshalled if
the argument is to be made at trial. Objections to things like the organization
of the verdict form in the capital sentencing proceeding (a subject of heavy
litigation that has spawned a significant body of law) 54 are, by comparison,
easy. So defense counsel operating under severe time and resource constraints
may tend to substitute the latter for the former. The result is the seeming
paradox we now have: a system with elaborate and carefully constructed
procedures that cannot reliably generate sound results. Not only does more
process not mean more accuracy, more process may actually mean less
accuracy, because it encourages defense lawyers and courts to shift energy and
attention away from the merits and toward procedure. In their desire to
construct the best possible process for determining who must die, appellate
courts may make the determinations worse.
In all three areas-trial litigation, appellate litigation, and capital murder
litigation-the tradeoffs between constitutional litigation and other sorts of
claims or arguments do not merely change the mix of claims a particular
defendant raises. They also change which defendants aggressively contest the
charges against them, meaning that they change the distribution of defense
victories. Appointed defense counsel usually represent many criminal clients.
Legal ethics doctrine treats these relationships as wholly distinct; decisions
made in one case are not supposed to affect decisions made in others. 55 But
resource constraints make that impossible. Whatever ethical rules may say,
lawyers must to some degree trade off claims and arguments across clients. A
decision to take case X to trial makes trial marginally less likely in case Y,
simply because counsel cannot afford to try too many cases; rationing applies
to the whole of counsel's caseload, not to any one case. The same thing is true
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE To ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 13-14 exh.2 (1996)
(finding three cases of defendants sentenced to death and subsequently exonerated by DNA testing).
153. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 147, at 415-21.
154. The leading Supreme Court decisions are McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); and
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
155. This follows from counsel's duty of loyalty, which is to the individual client, not to the class of
counsel's clients taken as a whole. See generally I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.3:106 to :108 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the formation of attorney-
client relationships in terms specific to individual clients). For a provocative article that explores the cross-
client effects of public defenders' work, and how legal ethics should respond to those effects, see Kim
Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84
GEO. L.J. 2419 (1996).
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with suppression motions and self-defense claims, which do not necessarily
arise in the same cases. More of the former must mean fewer of the latter,
again because there is only so much time and it must be spread across so many
cases.
None of this suggests that huge numbers of innocent defendants are
incarcerated because of the law of criminal procedure. The dearth of factual
investigation by appointed defense counsel is mostly the product of resource
constraints. Even if Fourth and Fifth Amendment law were abolished, defense
lawyers would find it impossible to do a thorough job of representing most of
their clients. And the likelihood that innocents are being convicted may be
lower than it was in the days when there was much less crime-a high ratio
of crimes to prosecutors is the best protection for innocent defendants because
it allows for more selectivity; it tends to keep prosecutors from casting their
net too broadly.' 56 But criminal procedure probably does cause the system
to do a poorer job of separating the guilty from the innocent than it otherwise
would, holding resources constant. Constitutional law helps some
defendants-and probably raises the overall level of defense victories-by
giving their lawyers claims and arguments that otherwise would not exist. But
those claims and arguments displace something. Some part, and quite possibly
a large part, of what is displaced is attorney investigation and litigation of the
merits. That harms defendants with marginal but colorable merits claims,
claims that are less likely to be investigated and hence less likely ever to see
the light of day.
C. Reacting to the Defense: The Prosecution (Continued)
Concern over the system's skill at separating the guilty from the innocent
presupposes that the latter category exists. Not everyone accepts this premise.
In a high-crime society in which police and prosecutors have many possible
cases from which to choose, perhaps only the clearly guilty make it through
the initial screening process. Perhaps Ed Meese's (in)famous claim that only
the guilty are charged with crime 57 was right.
This argument highlights an important and underrated feature of our
current system: the degree to which the sorting of defendants is done by
prosecutors rather than by judges and juries. One-fifth of felony arrestees in
state cases are never charged; another fifth are not convicted, and still another
fifth are never incarcerated (meaning, for the most part, they received favorable
156. For the same reason, prosecutors' view of what constitutes a sulticicntly senous oflense to justify
criminal intervention is likely to change with crime rates. Cf Austin & Knsberg. supra note 93. at 177
(discussing the tendency of criminal justice "insiders" to support decnminalizing marginal otlenses)
157. Actually, Meese's claim was more extreme: that only the guilty are nuSpects See Marc Miller
& Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Putit.lunenti. 75 MINN L REv 335. 414 n 419 (1990)
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charging decisions). 58 In a system with those kinds of numbers, the
prosecutor represents the best shot any defendant, guilty or innocent, has at a
favorable outcome. So the prosecutor's incentive to screen cases well, to
separate those who are clearly guilty from those who are not, is key to the
system's success at separating those categories. That incentive, in turn, depends
on the litigation that takes place in contested cases. Criminal litigation is the
price prosecutors pay for charging errors. The nature of that price, and when
it is paid, helps determine who will be charged with what.' 9
That is the real answer to the claim that innocents probably do not exist
in sufficient numbers to be worth worrying about. The claim is likely to be
correct only in a system in which prosecutors screen well. But prosecutors are
likely to screen well only if criminal litigation encourages them to do so;
otherwise, successful sorting of criminal defendants depends on nothing more
than prosecutorial good will.
And criminal procedure diminishes this incentive to screen well; or, to be
more precise, it encourages prosecutors to screen differently than they
otherwise would. In the criminal process, the presence of plausible
constitutional claims is a poor proxy for plausible claims on the merits.
Discriminatory jury selection may lead to biased juries, which then do a bad
job of deciding whether the defendant is guilty. Yet there is no good reason
to treat any particular instance of discriminatory jury selection as a signal that
this jury erred in finding this defendant guilty; a much better way to identify
likely errors would be to look at the evidence in particular cases. A great many
158. See 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 546 tbl.5.53 (reporting the results of a study of felony
arrests in eight states showing that 81% of arrestees are prosecuted, 59% are convicted, and 39% are
incarcerated).
159. This idea-that decisions not to litigate are made against the backdrop of legal rules that would
govern litigation if it happened-is commonplace in discussions of civil settlements. Curiously, it is not
such a common idea in the literature on prosecutors. That literature has done little to address the question
of why prosecutors charge in some cases rather than in others. The most thorough descriptive work, FRANK
W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969), emphasizes both
resource constraints and prosecutors' substantive goals, but offers no approach to predicting outcomes when
these factors point in different directions.
Discussion of prosecutorial incentives is fairly advanced in analyses of the effects of the federal
sentencing guidelines, see Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1471 (1993), and of successive prosecution, see Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future
Jeopardy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1181 (1996), but elsewhere we have not advanced beyond the proposition that
prosecutors are generally interested in both high conviction rates and the avoidance of unnecessary work,
see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 50-
52 (1988). The first of these goals follows from prosecutors' political status-most district attorneys' offices
are headed by an elected official. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939 (1997) (explaining connections among electoral
accountability, litigation incentives, and conviction rates). The second goal follows from prosecutors'
payment mechanism: They are paid on salary, not by the case.
For purposes of my argument, I assume that, whatever else prosecutors are seeking to do (and there
is no doubt a good deal else), they are indeed seeking to maintain high conviction rates and to avoid
needless labor, as Schulhofer suggests. That is, I assume prosecutors prefer winning to losing, and prefer
less litigation to more. Both preferences push prosecutors, where possible, to substitute cases likely to
generate little or no litigation for cases likely to generate a lot. The content of the latter category depends,
in turn, on what sorts of claims, and what sorts of cases, are litigated.
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criminal procedure claims are like that: They correlate (if at all) only very
slightly with strong claims on the merits.
For much of criminal procedure, the correlation is actually negative:
Defendants with strong constitutional claims are more likely to be guilty than
defendants as a whole. This is obviously true of search and seizure law, which
is invoked in criminal proceedings only when there is incriminating evidence
to suppress. It is very likely true of Miranda doctrine as well, since that
doctrine requires the suppression of incriminating statements and since most
Miranda violations probably have little to do with the reliability of the
statements being suppressed.' For these sorts of claims, defense litigation
not only fails to advance separation of the guilty from the innocent, it actually
retards the system's ability to separate. Defense lawyers shifting time and
energy from factual investigation to criminal procedure litigation are probably
shifting time and energy from one set of defendants to another, and the losers
in this shift are likely to be defendants with colorable but undiscovered factual
arguments.
This shift may be fairly small, but its effects are magnified by prosecutors.
If defense litigation is skewed toward some claims and away from others,
prosecutors' incentive to screen cases will be skewed in the same way. The
effect that matters most may not be the change in defense attorney litigation,
but the ancillary change in prosecutors' charging decisions.
An extreme example should make the point."' Imagine two jurisdictions,
one with very pro-defendant procedural doctrines that seem to help innocent
160. The core of Miranda is its bar on policc-initiated interrogation alter a suspcct has invoked his
right to counsel. See William J Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Crunminal Procedure. 75 VA L Ri-v 761, 8 18-22
(1989); supra notes 61-63. Recent empirical work suggests that the overwhelming majorit) of invocations
of the right to counsel occur shortly after arrest, not after extended questioning See Paul G Cassell & Bret
S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990.%: An Empirical Study of the Effect- of Miranda, 43 UCLA L
REV. 839, 859-61 (1996); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited. 86 J CRtI L &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653 (1996). In other work, Cassell has also shown that the dominant elfect of Airanda
stems not from the famous warnings but from the bar on post-invocation questioning by the police See
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Rea.se.% ieni. 90 Nw U L Riv 387. 492-96
(1996). It follows that violations of the bar on post-invocation questioning, which probably constitute the
majority of Miranda violations, are unlikely to involve the kind of pressure that would lead innocent
defendants to confess. Such violations are more likely to take the form of routine police questioning at a
time when questioning is forbidden.
Ironically, cases that may involve the kind ol coercion that A ould lead innocents to conless may not
raise Miranda violations in the first place, because once Miranda warnings are given and the suspect agrees
to talk, courts seem to indulge a strong presumption that an) statement that follo% s is voluntary See Louis
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL L REv 673. 74446 (1992) Peter Arenella notes that
homicide interrogations tend to last a good deal longer than interrogations for other ollenses See Peter
Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 375. 379 n 25 (1997) (citing DAVID SLtox.
HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 206 (1991) These are precisely the sort o1 cases in which
suspects may become confused or worn down, leading to conlessions that are not necessarily reliable
Miranda's focus on the warnings rather than the interrogation process provides little protection against
errors in such cases. Thus it is possible that Miranda makes it both harder to get conlessions from the
guilty and easier to get them from the innocent
161. This argument is developed at greater length in William J Stunt,. Lauv vers. Deception. and
Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1929-34 (1993)
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and guilty defendants alike, the other with few such doctrines. In the
jurisdiction with very pro-defendant doctrine, innocent defendants, on average,
face a 25% chance of conviction once charged; for guilty defendants, the
average is 40%. Odds vary in particular cases. In the more hard-line
jurisdiction, the average chance of conviction for innocent defendants is 40%,
while the average for guilty defendants is 90%. In neither jurisdiction do
prosecutors know who is guilty and who is innocent. To prosecutors, all
defendants look (very probably) guilty. But prosecutors can do a decent job of
estimating the odds, ex ante, that the defendant will win.'62 Finally, assume
that both jurisdictions have high ratios of crimes to prosecutors: Many cases
must be dismissed and many others must be bargained down, because there is
not enough time to pursue all plausible charges. Which jurisdiction would
innocent suspects prefer?
If prosecutors filed charges in all plausible cases, the answer would be
clear: Innocents would prefer the first, more pro-defendant jurisdiction, because
a defense victory would be more likely there. But given a high crime-to-
prosecutor ratio, meaning a good deal of selectivity in charging, innocents are
better off in the second jurisdiction. In the first, more pro-defendant
jurisdiction, prosecutors lose little by guessing wrong about defendants'
innocence or guilt, because the odds of convicting the guilty are not vastly
higher than the odds of convicting the innocent. Mistaking a probable loss for
a slightly more probable loss is, from the prosecutor's point of view, a shame
but hardly a disaster. And, of course, in any system where defense victories are
so common, any given defense victory would tend not to be terribly
salient-the fear of losing is much higher when losing is a rare event than
when it is the norm.
In the second jurisdiction, on the other hand, prosecutorial misjudgments
about innocence and guilt (or about the odds of conviction, which correlate
strongly with innocence and guilt) are much more costly. A prosecutor who
mistakes a "40% case" for a "90% case" has substituted a likely loser for an
almost-sure winner. If there are many such mistakes, the prosecutor
significantly lowers her success rate, for which she pays a political price. And
in a world filled with "90% cases," individual government losses will tend to
162. It may seem contradictory to suppose that (I) on average, innocent defendants have a much better
chance of prevailing at trial than guilty ones; (2) prosecutors do a reasonably good job of estimating
defendants' odds of conviction at trial; and (3) prosecutors believe all defendants are guilty. Yet all three
propositions are very probably true of the existing system. (The only doubtful point is the first one: As no
one knows how many innocent defendants there are, no one knows how well they fare at trial. Still, if the
trial process accomplishes anything at all, it must be that innocents win a disproportionate share of
acquittals.) The seeming contradiction disappears on either of two grounds. First, prosecutors do not know
the average odds of acquittal for guilty and innocent defendants; they know only the odds for individual
defendants. Second, the averages are just that-averages. In the hypothetical in the text as in life, guilty
defendants are usually easy to convict but not always; innocent defendants often have strong cases but
sometimes not. That being so, prosecutors could fairly easily convince themselves that a given defendant
is guilty notwithstanding that he has a good chance of victory if the case goes to trial.
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be salient, at least relative to a world where defendants win much more often.
Finally, of course, if prosecutors must be selective, they do not have the option
of taking all the clear winners and then picking from among the likely losers;
every losing case the prosecutor pursues represents a winner (probably several
winners, given the greater ease with which 90% cases can be turned into guilty
pleas) that was passed up. These costs encourage prosecutors to avoid charging
the 40% cases. That helps innocent defendants-indeed, it helps them more
than anything else the system does, for it prevents them from becoming
defendants in the first place.
Now consider the lesson from this stylized example. In a high-crime, high-
discretion system, innocent defendants should probably care more about the
gap between their own chances at trial and the chances of guilty defendants
than about their chances of success in absolute terms. The size of the gap
determines prosecutors' incentive to pay close attention to strong and weak
cases, to do a good job of deciding who is plainly guilty and who might not
be. And, as a practical matter, prosecutors decide most cases. Criminal
procedure litigation tends to narrow the gap between the odds of convicting
the guilty and the odds of convicting the innocent, because it bestows its
victories either indiscriminately (innocent and guilty defendants alike might be
indicted by improperly selected grand juries) or perversely (only the guilty are
likely to have strong Fourth Amendment claims). It thereby reduces
prosecutors' incentive to separate the guilty from the innocent at the charging
stage.
Like other litigators, prosecutors prefer winning to losing. Like other
bureaucrats, they also prefer cheap matters to expensive ones. Both preferences
push prosecutors to screen cases according to the way (and the likelihood that)
those cases will be litigated if charged. The more criminal litigation focuses
on procedure, the bigger the incentive for prosecutors to screen cases with
procedure in mind. The less criminal litigation focuses on the merits, the
smaller the incentive for prosecutors to make sure they are charging only in
strong cases-which is to say, the smaller the incentive to charge only guilty
defendants.
D. Distribution, Discretion, and Discrimination
Given the way the criminal justice system is presently organized,
defendants' rights have complicated, and to some degree perverse, distributive
consequences. Those consequences are, in turn, tied closely to the discretionary
nature of the relevant decisions. Prosecutors are free to steer their charging
decisions in one direction or another. Defense counsel are free to steer their
litigation toward some claims rather than others. Legislatures are free to fund
criminal defense generously or not. And, of course, legislatures can define
substantive criminal law broadly or narrowly. The law of criminal procedure
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alters the calculus of these decisions in some harmful ways, without changing
the power of the people who make them.
That suggests an important constraint on the law of criminal
procedure-something it probably cannot do, at least in its current form. It
cannot stop discrimination. According to the conventional understanding, much
of the reason for the criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s was the need
to rein in a discriminatory criminal justice system, to keep police and
prosecutors from victimizing, not just criminal defendants in general, but black
defendants in particular.'63 Defendants' rights were to serve as the reins. But
defendants' rights address only one form of discrimination, and it is probably
the least important form that the system engages in. Because of Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment law, the system cannot give jury trials or lawyers to
white defendants but not to black ones, and the police cannot use search
warrants only when searching Latino suspects' houses. Constitutional standards
prevent discrimination that takes the form of violating those very standards.
But constitutional law has little to say about the decisions that are most likely
to be made discriminatorily, because constitutional law leaves intact a high
level of discretion on the part of legislatures, prosecutors, police officers, and
defense attorneys. Selection of suspects or defendants-charging black drug
dealers more readily than white ones-is basically unregulated.' 64 The
manner in which suspects are arrested-how much force the police use, and
whether they tend to use more force on some kinds of suspects than others-is
regulated only slightly, because police violence tends not to be tied to police
evidence gathering, and only evidence gathering is likely to give rise to
exclusionary rule claims. 65 Most importantly, the definition of crimes and
the fixing of sentences is constitutionally unregulated, meaning that the law of
criminal procedure leaves legislatures free to adopt drug and sentencing
policies that lead to massive increases in the proportion of black prisoners-as
163. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. For a good discussion of this point and its relevance
to originalist arguments in criminal procedure generally and the debate about the exclusionary rule in
particular, see Steiker, supra note 3, at 838-52.
164. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), shows how hard it is to make out a claim of
discriminatory prosecution, since the substantial race-of-the-victim bias shown in that case did not suffice.
McCleskey, a black man convicted of killing a white man, relied on a study that showed, inter alia, that
the death penalty was imposed in 22% of cases with black perpetrators and white victims, 8% of cases with
white perpetrators and white victims, 3% of cases with white perpetrators and black victims, and only I%
of cases with black perpetrators and black victims. See id. at 286. The Court rejected McCleskey's equal
protection claim on the ground that his data did not establish any intentional discrimination in his case. See
id. at 292-97. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), shows how hard it is even to trigger
discovery obligations, so that claimants might obtain the information they need to meet the standard
McCleskey sets. In Anmstrong, the claimants proffered evidence that the pool of federal crack defendants
in the relevant district was entirely black. The Supreme Court held that the claimants had to prove thc
existence of cases involving white suspects that might have been charged but were not. See id. at 1483-84,
1488-89.
165. This point is elaborated in William J. Stuntz, Privacys Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. RIv. 1016, 1060-68 (1995).
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legislatures have done.'6 6 If one is looking for race discrimination in the
administration of criminal justice, these are the places to find it. And the law
of criminal procedure has almost nothing to say about them.
Indeed, that law raises the potential for discrimination, or at least the
potential for policies with a racially disparate impact. If poor defendants are
disproportionately black,'67 the law of criminal procedure not only makes the
universe of defendants poorer, but blacker as well. Similarly, steering litigation
away from factual innocence claims may have a race effect, because black
defendants may have a disproportionate share of plausible-but-not-ironclad
claims: Consider the strong evidence that cross-racial eyewitness identifications
are worth vastly less than juries tend to believe,' and note that black-on-
white crime vastly exceeds the white-on-black variety 6. (so that cross-racial
identifications will tend to victimize black defendants much more often than
white ones).
And criminal procedure raises the cost of pursuing some sorts of crime
more than others. Fourth Amendment law makes drug investigations somewhat
costlier, because it forbids most sweeps, blanket searches, and suspicionless
street stops. 170 This may have played some part in legislatures' decisions to
ratchet up drug sentences over the past generation: The costlier it is to catch
offenders, the more important it is to punish them severely when caught.' 7 '
166. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon as it applies to federal sentencing or crack and
cocaine powder defendants, see David A. Sklansky. Cocaine, Race. and Equal Protection. 47 STAN L
REV. 1283 (1995). For an equally good discussion that covers drug and sentencing policy more generally.
see MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE. CRIMIE. ANt) PUNISHM..N" IN A.MERICA (1995)
167. They almost certainly are. Defendants as a whole are disproportionatcly black See, e g.
Developmentr in the Law-Race and tie Criminal Process. 101 HARv L REv 1472. 1525-28 t l988)
(citing sources). Defendants as a whole are also disproportionately poor Eighty percent of them receive
appointed counsel. See Smith & DeFrances, 3upra note 7. at 4 Finally. white collar defendants, a
substantial slice of the universe of defendants with money. are much more often white than defendants as
a whole and slightly whiter than the general population See WhISBURD -r AL. supra note 101. at 70
168. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cros3-Racial Identnficarton Errors in Cruinzal Caaes. 69 CORNi.-.L L
REV. 934, 937-38 (1984).
169. The gap is best established for murder- According to the FBI. 1994 say. 790 black.on.vhite
murders and 337 white-on-black murders. See FBI. UNIi-RM CRLM R'Powrs. CRLImt- IN 'i. UNrm..t)
STATES 1994, at 17 tbl.2.8 (1995).
170. Delaware %, Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), forbids suspicionless stops ol automobiles. Ybarra
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), and Terr' v. Olo, 392 U S 1 (1968), stand lot the same proposition lot
individuals. Group seizures are, for now, permissible only in the context of drunk driving roadblocks, see
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444.451-55 (1990). though that category may grow Even
if a brief seizure is justifiable, under current law the police may not search absent either consent or
reasonable suspicion that weapons are present-suspicion that drugs may be present does not sulfice See
Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry. 392 U S at 24-27
171. For a rare acknowledgment of this connection between criminal procedure and sentencing policy.
see William T. Pizzi, Punisluent and Procedure: A Different Uew of the Atercan Criinial Justice
System, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 55, 65-69 (1996). As Pizi rightly notes. the connection runs both ways
"Harsh punishments in turn encourage even more emphasis on procedure." as courts seek to protect
defendants from the consequences of legislative seventy. Id at 67
For another example of more expensive process producing higher sentences. see RosN'Bi-.RG. supra
note 94, at 314-16, which notes that, after juvenile defendants were al forded the right to counsel, sentences
of juveniles using lawyers were higher than sentences of uncounseled juveniles
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As Michael Tonry and others have noted, the rise in severity of drug sentences
has dramatically increased the proportion of blacks in prison."' Of course,
other factors entered into those sentencing policies; Fourth Amendment law
was not the sole or even primary cause. But Fourth Amendment law did make
those policies marginally more attractive and hence, perhaps, marginally more
extreme.
The point is that constitutional criminal procedure not only carries some
perverse distributive consequences; it also fails in the task that, more than
anything else, prompted its design. The reason is that the law of criminal
procedure is part of a larger system in which a variety of actors have a great
deal of freedom of movement. Those actors respond to the law; they also
respond to other forces outside the law, to crime rates and caseloads and
funding levels. The combined effect of these forces is complicated. Any fair
evaluation involves a good deal of guesswork. Still, two propositions seem
fairly clear. First, defendants' rights do not live up to their billing: Resource
constraints make constitutional enforcement spotty, and constitutional law
leaves discrimination almost untouched. Second, defendants' rights advantage
some defendants at the cost of disadvantaging others, and the selection of
winners and losers does not do the system credit.
III. DEFINING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Why is it so hard to protect the interests criminal procedure protects
without disadvantaging the poor and the innocent, at least marginally, relative
to the rich and the guilty? One answer, as I have tried to suggest, lies in crime
rates and resource decisions that might change over time. Indeed, they already
have-crime rates are falling, dramatically in some places.' Resources may
continue to rise. The problems that produce these perverse distributive effects
are probably less severe now than they were five years ago. Perhaps they will
be less severe still five years from now. On this view, the perverse dynamics
of the criminal process may not be worth worrying about.
172. For the best discussions, see TONRY, supra note 166, at 81-83, 104-115; and Sklansky, supra note
166, at 1283-90.
173. On the recent nationwide drop in crime rates, see, for example, Fox Butterfield, Large Drop in
Violent Crime Is Reported, N.Y. TnIEs, Sept. 18, 1996, at A14. On the more dramatic drop in New York
City's crime rate, see Clifford Krauss, New York Crime Rate Plummets to Levels Not Seen in 30 Years,
N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 20, 1996, at Al.
The decline in serious crime does not necessarily equal a decline in prosecutors' dockets. One
approach to crime control that has achieved a great deal of popularity of late is to raise sharply the level
of prosecution for low-level street offenses such as vandalism, as a means of signaling a commitment to
public order. See generally GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXINO BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996) (advocating this approach). That
can lead to an increase in case pressure, even if the strategy is successful in lowering crime rates. See
Clyde Haberman, Crime Down, But Courts Are Clogged, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 3, 1997, at B I (reporting this
effect).
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Another answer is less pleasant. The most fundamental structural feature
of rights in the criminal process is that appellate courts define them. Almost
no one argues with this regime; the constitutionalization of criminal procedure,
in a society in which judges define constitutional law, today goes
unchallenged. That is a serious mistake, for the current allocation of authority
between courts and legislatures encourages each side to undermine the other.
The problem with the criminal process may not be particular rules or practices,
but rather the system that defines what that process should look like.
A. The Structure of the System
A growing body of literature argues that constitutional law is a lot more
majoritarian-even measuring majoritarian preferences over the short-to-
medium term-than we tend to think.7' However well this argument may
describe constitutional law generally, it plainly does not fit criminal procedure.
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment law is nothing if not countermajoritarian.
No legislature has passed anything like Miranda. On the contrary, the only
legislative response to that decision was a congressional effort to overrule
it.' 75 The same is generally true of Mapp v- Ohio's imposition of the
exclusionary rule,176 the law defining effective assistance of counsel, most
of double jeopardy doctrine, the several bodies of law that regulate jury
selection-indeed, almost everything in the law of constitutional criminal
procedure.'77 Elsewhere, constitutional law may be in the habit of adopting
standards that at least some political majorities have adopted for themselves.
In criminal procedure, the strong pattern is to impose standards on the federal
and state governments that those governments would not have imposed on
themselves, and for which the population at large would not vote if given the
chance.
7 8
174. The argument has been most thoroughly developed by Michael Klarman Set Michael J Klarman.
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Laberties Revolutions. 82 VA L Rxv I 1996) For two . anations
on the theme, see ROSENBERG. supra note 94, which denies courts' abilities to engender countermajontarnan
social reform, and Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Reveni, 91 Mcliti L Ri-v 577 (1993). which
treats judicial review as part of a majontanan dialogue with legislatures
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (making confessions admissible in any federal criminal proceeding
if voluntarily given and investing trial judges with the discretion to determine any issues as to
voluntariness).
176. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
177. The only major exceptions arc the existence of a broad nght to jury trial. which was well
enshrined before the Supreme Court required it in Duncan v Louisiana. 391 U S 145 (1968). and the nght
to appointed counsel for indigent defendants, which most states already provided. alter a fashion. % hen the
Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
178. To be sure, legislatures could overtum some cnminad procedure doctrnes Both Mapp and
Miranda are now deemed to be not quite constitutionally required rules subject to legislative revision See.
e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule is not
constitutionally required); New York v. Quarles. 467 U.S 649. 654 (1984) (holding the same for Miranda)
Even for doctrines in that category, however, legislative overruling is extremely nsky Courts could
conclude that the regime substituted for the overturned cnminal procedure doctinne is not in adequate
replacement. And under current retroactivity doctrines, that would place at nsk every enminal conviction
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Not surprisingly, this state of affairs leads to a fair amount of concern with
judicial overreaching. The court system has not ignored that concern. On the
contrary, it is probably a large part of why courts (the Supreme Court in
particular) have limited the sphere of judicial intervention in the criminal
justice system-why they have placed constitutional law securely in the
confines of the criminal process. Constitutionally speaking, substantive
criminal law is almost entirely unregulated. 79 And as is generally true
elsewhere in constitutional law, resource allocation, the funding of the system,
is left to the politicians.
So the law of constitutional criminal procedure conforms to a classic
constitutional model. It is plainly, even aggressively, countermajoritarian within
its sphere, but the sphere is carefully limited. In good Hart and Sacks
fashion, 8 ' the law focuses on process rather than substance, and it seeks to
avoid directing government taxing and spending decisions. Note the familiar
combination of judicial aggressiveness on procedure, the sort of thing courts
are supposed to be good at, with deference to political majorities on substance
and funding, issues that seem more political and value-laden. It is not only a
familiar structure, but a profoundly conservative one. Perhaps that is why the
character of constitutional law in this area is so rarely contested in the cases
or literature. The system seems to exhibit a sense of balance, at once protecting
minorities and leaving room for majorities to govern as they wish.
Yet given the dynamic outlined in Part II, this system is less a careful
balance than a vicious circle. Countermajoritarian criminal procedure tends to
encourage legislatures to pass overbroad criminal statutes and to underfund
defense counsel. These actions in turn tend to mask the costs of procedural
rules, thereby encouraging courts to make more such rules. That raises
legislatures' incentive to overcriminalize and underfund. So the circle goes.
This is a necessary consequence of a system with extensive, judicially defined
regulation of the criminal process, coupled with extensive legislative authority
over everything else.
There is another consequence of this structure. The system may well need
something that neither legislatures nor courts can provide: It may need, not
more money for criminal defense or less constitutional regulation of the
process, but both at the same time. More money without less law might only
make for more procedural litigation. Less law without more money would not
in the trial and appellate pipelines in which evidence obtained under the new regime had been used. See
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding that new rules are to be applied retroactively on direct
review). The magnitude of this risk explains why no state has undertaken any serious effort to experiment
with alternatives to Mapp and Miranda. And, of course, the risk is even greater for rules that are, at least
nominally, constitutionally required: There, any legislative alteration is presumptively impermissible.
179. For an elaboration of this point and its consequences, see Stuntz, supra note 5. See also infra Part
IV.
180. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
[Vol. 107: 1
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice
address the resource constraints that so severely limit attorney investigation.
But since courts control the law and legislatures control the money, changing
both at the same time in the right directions is impossible. Instead, the current
regime encourages change in the wrong directions: Overregulation and
underfunding feed on each other.
B. Legislatures' Incentives
Consider first the legislative half of this dynamic. Legislatures presumably
fund enterprises more or less generously according to some mix of their
political and social value (measuring the latter by legislators' lights, not by
courts'). The more criminal defense counsel litigate claims of which
legislatures disapprove-the more counsel serve as watchdogs for rights
legislatures did not enact and do not like-the less funding counsel can be
expected to receive, all else being equal.'8 '
The natural consequence is constrained funding for criminal defense.
Overall funding for criminal defense has declined on a per case basis since the
late 1970s,1 2  a period in which the law of criminal procedure
mushroomed-which ought to have raised litigation costs. And, of course,
there is a good deal of anecdotal evidence that funding for criminal defense is
very low in absolute terms, that public defenders in many jurisdictions must
cope with mind-boggling caseloads.1 3 Finally, in some jurisdictions criminal
defense spending has actually been cut-not just per case spending, but total
181. One sees this dynamic most starkly in recent congressional efforts to rein in the Legal Services
Corporation. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropnations Act of 1996. Pub L No 104-134.
110 Stat. 1321 [hereinafter OCRAAI. Congress cut funding for legal services not primarily to save money.
but because of "the conviction of many Republicans in Congress that legal aid lawyers promote a left-wing
agenda through lobbying and litigation." Robert Pear, As Welfare Overhaul Looms. Legal Aid for Poor
Dwindles, N.Y. T04Es, Sept. 5, 1995, at Al.
The cuts in legal aid went beyond funding; most famously. Congress barred the filing of class actions
by federally funded legal services agencies. See OCRAA § 504(a)(7)- This restnction is already running
into problems in the courts, however. See Don Van Natta, Jr, Legal Services Wins on Suit for rie Poor,
N.Y. TimdEs, Dec. 27, 1996, at BI (reporting on a state court decision that the class action ban is
unconstitutional); see also Recent Legislation, Conawurioial Law--Congress Imposes Nes Restrictions on
Use of Funds by the Legal Services Corporation, 110 HARv L REV 1346 (1997) (arguing that the
restrictions are unconstitutional). Even if a similar approach to criminal defense-seeking to rein in some
claims but not others-were administratively possible. it would plainly be constitutionally suspect, given
the constitutional status of the relevant claims.
182. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text
183. See, e.g., KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 20, at 1.4, supra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text.
The surprise is that funding for criminal defense has been treated as well as it has As a proportion
of total state and local budgets for criminal justice, criminal defense actually grew between 1979 and
1990-defense budgets rose 274% during that penod, as compared to an overall rise in cnminal justice
budgets of 187% (one must keep in mind that these are non-tillation-adjusted dollars) See 1993
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 3 thl.l.3. Yet these figures must be read against the backdrop of rising
caseloads, including a steep rise in the proportion of cases in which defendants receive appointed counsel
See supra notes 7, 11-32 and accompanying text
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spending.'84 Spending cuts for prosecution and the court system are
unknown.
The standard politician's gripe about defendants winning on
"technicalities" suggests that constitutional law has played some role in these
developments. That would be quite natural. From the politicians' perspective,
the law of criminal procedure has reduced the benefit of the marginal dollar
of defense funding, because it ensures that a substantial part of that dollar will
be spent in ways legislators do not want. The logical result is less money for
defense than in a world with fewer of the hated "technicalities." The law of
criminal procedure thus may give defense counsel more arguments to
raise-more arrows in the quiver-but at the cost of also giving them less time
and money to work with-fewer shots at the target.
Given the tendency of legal claims and arguments to drive out factual ones
(because the former are cheaper to evaluate and litigate than the latter), this
dynamic is self-reinforcing. Lower funding of criminal defense reduces all
sorts of defense litigation, but the reduction may not be evenly distributed.
Factual litigation probably suffers more-as resource constraints become more
severe, procedural litigation's cost advantage becomes more compelling. The
result is likely to be a system where litigation is more concentrated on
procedural issues. The sense that technicalities dominate the system thus is
bound to grow even as legislatures seek to combat those very technicalities.
A similar dynamic is at work for wealthy criminal defendants, though here
the dominant legislative lever is not money but substantive law. Recall that
criminal procedure tends to raise the cost of criminal prosecution, but does not
do so evenly. Rather, it tends to raise the relative cost of prosecuting
defendants with money, who can best afford to litigate aggressively. One
result, as I suggested in Part II, is to encourage federal rather than local
prosecution of such defendants. Another result is to drive Congress to broaden
the definition of crimes (and raise sentences, which has much the same effect
as more broadly defined crimes) that better-off defendants commit. By defining
crimes more broadly, legislatures make proof of guilt easier, which converts
otherwise contestable cases into guilty pleas, thereby avoiding most of the
costs criminal procedure creates.'85 The same, to some degree, is true of
higher mandatory sentences, which raise the risk to defendants of taking their
cases to trial and thus once again tend to convert otherwise contested cases
into guilty pleas.'86
184. For examples, see Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis is
Chronic, CRMI. JUST., Summer 1994, at 13-14; and Taylor-Thompson, supra note 155, at 2431 & n.59. The
Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that his state's spending on indigent defense was
cut during the late 1980s while the caseload was undergoing a 45% increase. See Pascal F. Calogcro, Jr.,
The State of Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 42 LA. B.J. 454, 456-57 (1995).
185. See Stuntz, supra note 5, at 7-19.
186. For an elaboration, see Scott & Stuntz, supra note 135, at 1960-66.
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One sees this effect in several areas of federal criminal law that tend to
involve a heavy proportion of wealthy defendants. Prosecuting organized crime
used to mean proving conspiracy. RICO does away with proof of
agreement,'87 and also ratchets up penalties. 8 Forfeiture laws make it
much easier for the government to tie up defendants' resources based on a
showing that those resources were probably (not beyond a reasonable doubt)
the product of a criminal enterprise,"'9 which obviously helps prosecutors to
neutralize the wealth advantage of major drug dealers. And the sharp rise in
drug sentences since the early 1980s has made it possible to use possession or
possession with intent to distribute, which are more easily proved than
distribution and conspiracy to distribute, as proxies for those more serious
offenses."'
The most striking example is the range of federal statutes that cover white
collar crime-mail and wire fraud, securities fraud, currency and banking
offenses, and so forth. The number of such statutes has grown substantially in
the past thirty years, and a number of older offenses (including mail and wire
fraud, which are probably the most important ones) have been legislatively
broadened. 9 The upshot is that white collar offenses, unlike traditional
street crimes such as burglary, robbery, or homicide, cover a vast range of
conduct that neither Congress nor prosecutors could plausibly wish to punish.
Mail and wire fraud include deprivations of so-called "intangible rights,"'92
meaning that tangible injury need not be proved. (It also means that federal
fraud offenses extend to cases of low-level influence peddling that involve no
overt dishonesty.)' 93 Currency fraud includes not only the intentional
187. That is, RICO effectively broadens the scope of conspiracy liability by substituting criminal
enterprises for criminal agreements. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Crinmnal (pts. 3
& 4), 87 COLI. L. REV. 920, 945-55 (1987); see also Racketeerng lnllucnced and Corupt Organtzauons
(RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
188. See Lynch, supra note 187, at 924-28.
189. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)()(A) (1994) (permitting the government to freeze assets upon the
filing of an indictment or information charging a qualifying crime)
190. Between 1982 and 1992, the average federal sentence for drug trafficking offenses (wuch include
possession with intent to distribute) rose more than 40%, from 59.3 months to 84 3 months See 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 83, at 473 tbl.5.24.
191. On the expansion of mail and wire fraud, see Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called
Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C L_ REV 435 (1995) On the
expansion of other sorts of federal crime, see, for examplc, Pamela H. Bucy. Crimes by Health Care
Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 589; Brian T. FitzPatrick, Congressional Re-Election Through Symbolic
Politics: The Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM CRLM L. REV I (1994); Richard J. Lazarus.
Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental
Criminal Law, 83 GEo. L.J. 2407 (1995); and Rachel Ratliff, Third.Party Money Laundering- Problems
of Proof and Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 173 (1996).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994). For an example of the kind of intangible harm that this statute covers,
see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982). See also John Calvin Jeffnes Jr., Legahty.
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV 189. 234-42 (1985) (dtscussing
Margiona).
193. The "intangible rights" protected by federal fraud statutes include the right to honest government
services; the consequence is to cnminalize the use of private inlluence of a sort that has been the norm in
many jurisdictions on matters such as government hirng If, for example, a private citizen who plays a
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violation of reporting requirements for large cash transactions, but also the
intentional structuring of those transactions to avoid reporting. In other words,
altering one's course of action to comply with the reporting rules can be just
as much a crime as violating those rules, and this is so even if the defendant
did not know that such behavior was prohibited.'94 Criminal insider trading
does not necessarily require either proof of breach of a fiduciary duty or proof
that the defendant profited from the inside information. 95 There are many
other examples.
The breadth of these statutes, like the breadth of RICO and drug forfeiture
laws, does not mean that Congress intends actually to punish the entire range
of conduct it criminalizes. The more likely goal is to reduce the burden of
proving core offenders guilty. The government may wish to punish people who
satisfy criminal elements X, Y, and Z, but if Z is difficult to prove it is cheaper
to criminalize X and Y and let prosecutors separate the wheat from the chaff.
Hence the removal of elements like reliance, tangible injury, breach of duty,
and knowledge of possible illegality from a range of regulatory
crimes-elements that are probably present in almost all of the cases Congress
and federal prosecutors wish to pursue, but that are costly to prove.
Federal law and practice is where overcriminalization and oversentencing
seem most prevalent-and, not coincidentally, that is also where defendants
with resources are concentrated (which makes overcriminalization especially
useful from the government's perspective). Yet a version of the same
phenomenon occurs on a smaller scale at the state level, and not only to
wealthy defendants. Criminal sodomy laws, where they remain on the books,
serve as useful devices for extracting guilty pleas in sexual assault cases.' 96
The same is probably true of marijuana laws in jurisdictions where those laws
go largely unenforced; such unenforced prohibitions may be used as vehicles
major role in local Republican or Democratic politics tries to get a friend a government job in return for
the friend's help on a business transaction, the private citizen has committed mail or wire fraud. See Stuntz,
supra note 5, at 14 & n.37 (citing sources).
194. In Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), the Supreme Court held that such conduct was
not criminal. The defendant in Ratzlaf was charged under 31 U.S.C. § 5322, which made it a crime
"willfully" to violate 31 U.S.C. § 5324, which in turn forbade particular sorts of strategic structuring of
currency transactions. The Ratzlaf majority read the word "willfully" in § 5322 to require proof of
knowledge of illegality. See 510 U.S. at 141-49. Congress overturned this result by taking § 5324 offenses
out of § 5322, and by adding to § 5324 a new subsection, defining criminal violations without use of the
term "willfully." See Act of Sept. 23, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2253, 2254 (codified at 31
U.S.C.A. § 5324(c) (West Supp. 1997)).
195. One can criminally violate 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)(3) and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1997), without either breaching a fiduciary duty or profiting from the inside
information. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane). The Supreme Court
reinforced this conclusion last Term by holding that the SEC did not exceed its rulemaking authority in
adopting Rule 14e-3(a) without making breach of a fiduciary duty an element of the rule's violation. See
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214-19 (1997).
196. For examples of this phenomenon, see Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning
of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 189 & n.9; and Mitchell Lloyd Pearl, Note, Chipping Away at Bowers
v. Hardwick: Making the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154, 156-57 & nn. 14-15
(1988).
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for prosecuting people suspected of other, more serious offenses. Those are
examples of legislative passivity, of broadening criminal liability by leaving
on the books prohibitions that once were taken seriously but no longer are.
Other examples of state-law substantive manipulation are more straightforward.
Facing an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge, Michigan defended its
high mandatory sentences for cocaine possession as a means of punishing
distribution without having to prove it.'97 And traffic offenses are famously
used to create authority to stop drivers suspected of other crimes.' Like
unenforced crimes used to prosecute more traditional offenses, these practices
use substantive law to evade what would otherwise be expensive criminal
procedure requirements.
The greater the burdens these requirements impose, the more the
government gains from following this strategy. Jury trials are expensive,
especially given the way constitutional law regulates jury selection. But
overbroad offenses and high nominal sentences may save the government the
cost of a good many jury trials by making trials either pointless or risky for
defendants, who are thereby pushed to plead guilty. This effect applies not just
to the law surrounding juries, but to virtually everything in criminal procedure.
At the margin, every pro-defense procedural rule raises the gain to the
government from overcriminalization."'
And, ironically, overcriminalization tends to make criminal litigation ever
more focused on procedure. If tangible injury and reliance are elements of mail
fraud, defense counsel in some mail fraud cases will devote their energies to
those issues. If, on the other hand, fraud does not require proof of those
elements, fewer defendants will have potential merits claims to raise-for
them, litigation can only mean procedural litigation, challenges to grand jury
subpoenas and the like. The natural legislative response to too much procedure
works, in the sense that the government wins more cases more easily, but it
also makes for litigation that is more procedure-intensive than ever.
I do not mean to overstate the importance of this dynamic.
Overcriminalization and high mandatory sentences are not solely or even
primarily the product of criminal procedure; other, more visible forces are at
work as well. But the coincidence of these trends is at least interesting, and
perhaps telling. Federal criminal liability has broadened considerably over the
past generation, at the same time that constitutional criminal procedure has
exploded. And broader liability, together with other devices that tend to combat
defendants' wealth advantage, has been most marked in those areas where
criminal procedure rules have most raised the cost of prosecution.
197. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S 957, 1024-25 (1991) (White. J . dissenting) (noting and
rejecting the argument).
198. See Whren v. United States. 116S Ct 1769 (1996) (allowing the practice)
199. The preceding three paragraphs, with some modification. te drawn from Stunt,. 3upra note 5,
at 14-15.
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C. Appellate Courts' Perceptions
Part of the genius of the common law is its self-correcting process.
Appellate courts make law, the consequences of which tend to show up in
cases that make their way back to appellate courts. If new doctrines have
(unanticipated) bad consequences, appellate courts usually see them, and can
move to correct their mistakes.
Not so with the law that governs the criminal process. That law tends to
generate legislative moves-lower funding for criminal defense and broader
criminal liability for wealthier defendants-that hide its costs. In the past
generation, these moves have been reinforced by a social phenomenon: higher
levels of crime, which raise the ratio of crimes to prosecutors. Taken together,
these forces have made constitutional criminal procedure seem, from the
courts' perspective, surprisingly inexpensive. If prosecutors' offices had a great
deal of slack, expanded rights for criminal defendants might lead directly to
large numbers of government losses in the courtroom. In a world where
prosecutors work at or near capacity, where there are more good cases to bring
than there is time to bring them, expanded rights are more likely to prompt
prosecutors to substitute some cases for others. The courts see no sharp rise in
defense victories, and hence see the relevant constitutional rules as cheap. So
too, if criminal defense were funded generously, developments in constitutional
criminal procedure might tend to raise the level of defense litigation: More
cases might go to trial, and trial length might increase. But when funding is
low, criminal procedure tends to shift defense litigation from some claims to
others. Again, courts see no dire consequences from the law they create.
This is not to say that courts see no consequences at all. For reasons
spelled out in preceding sections, a world with heavy procedural regulation and
low levels of defense funding will tend to produce criminal litigation focused
on procedure-a fairly high number of suppression motions coupled with a
low level of factual investigation and an even lower level of factual litigation.
The level of criminal prosecution may not decline (as it hasn't), and the
frequency of government victories may remain constant or even increase (as
it has), but the kind of litigation courts see-perhaps especially the kind of
litigation appellate courts see-will tend to shift from fact claims to law
claims, from the merits of the criminal charge to the merits of the criminal
process.
So, in a world like ours, appellate courts are likely to see a system that
appears to function as it should: Defendants' many procedural rights seem to
work (hence the fairly high level of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment
litigation on appellate courts' criminal dockets, which suggests aggressive
enforcement), but those same rights seem not to prevent the government from
catching and punishing criminals (hence the continuing high level of
government success on outcomes and especially the high level of guilty pleas).
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Meanwhile, the absence of large numbers of serious sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claims tends to suggest that such claims must not exist-that absent
the very, very rare exception, all convicted defendants are guilty.
There are two natural responses to this misleadingly happy picture, and
appellate courts have exhibited both over the course of the last generation. The
first is not to worry much about guilt and innocence. The absence of strong
merits claims and the huge proportion of guilty pleas suggests to courts
(wrongly) that the system must be doing a good job of separating those who
committed crimes from those who did not. And rigorous attention to the merits
is costly, for it requires a serious analysis of the whole record. If the system
is doing a good job of sorting, that cost need not be borne.
One sees this reaction mostly in the paths the law of criminal procedure
has declined to follow. As the scope of various constitutional protections has
continued to expand, judicial review targeted at potential errors on the
merits-at cases where the wrong person was convicted-has been surprisingly
muted. When, for example, the Supreme Court established constitutional
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review in 1979, Justice Stevens predicted that
federal judges would be swamped by the resulting additional work.2' The
flood of new work never materialized, in part because appellate treatment of
the relevant claims has been so perfunctory. Ineffective assistance doctrine,
created in the 1970s and 1980s, has regulated conflicts of interest much more
rigorously than it has regulated attorney decisions not to make plausible factual
arguments. 20' The Court's 1985 decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, °" requiring
appointment of mental health experts to assist in preparing a criminal defense,
has had few ripple effects, remaining basically restricted to the very small pool
of insanity defense claims that go to trial.213 The constitutional requirement
that the government disclose material exculpatory evidence has yet to be
extended to and enforced at early stages of plea negotiation, where the defense
has most need of disclosure (because counsel has usually done no investigating
of her own).?
Most strikingly, as the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts have
developed standards of review for different kinds of constitutional claims, the
courts consistently have adopted more favorable standards of review for non-
200. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 337-39 (1979) (Stevens. J . concumng in the judgment)
201. See supra note 74 and accompanying text
202. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
203. See David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert P.ychatrc rsnee3es Remnain Beyond Reach for the
Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REV. 763, 769-80 (1990).
204. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in tie Guilty Plea Process. 40 HASTSGS L J
957, 957-58 (1989) (noting that the applicability of Brad), % Mar.anlrd. 373 U S 83 (1963). to guilty pleas
remains unresolved). The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue A few lower court cases state that
the government's disclosure obligation does apply to guilty pleas but go on to conclude that Brady was not
violated. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v Wright, 43 F3d
491 (10th Cir. 1994). Cases overturning guilty pleas based on Brady v'tolations are almost nonexistent See
McMunigal, supra, at 962-64 (discussing the lower court cases)
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guilt-related claims than for those claims most likely to be tied to guilt and
innocence. The erroneous denial of Fourth Amendment and Miranda claims
must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the government to escape
reversal on appeal. 05 But a defendant making an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim (again, outside of conflicts of interest, which may be least tied
to guilt or innocence and which require no showing of prejudice at all)'n6
must show a reasonable probability-substantially more than a reasonable
doubt-that counsel's error or errors caused the defendant's conviction. 7
The same tougher standard applies to claims that the government wrongfully
withheld material exculpatory evidence." 8 Nonconstitutional claims of newly
discovered evidence, of course, must meet an even tougher standard: The new
evidence must not only have been unavailable at the time of trial but must also
prove that the result reached at trial was probably wrong.0 9
The second natural response to the picture of criminal litigation that
appellate courts see is to tilt toward more constitutional regulation of the
process, since such regulation seems both effective and (unlike more careful
attention to the merits) cheap. That may help to explain the unusual pattern of
the past generation in criminal procedure. Beginning in the early 1970s and
running through the 1980s, the ideological composition of the Supreme Court
shifted dramatically, and a parallel, less dramatic shift occurred in the federal
judiciary as a whole. The general expectation was that this personnel change
would be the undoing of the constitutional revolution in criminal procedure of
the 1960s. Nothing of the sort happened. Some Warren Court decisions
suffered cutbacks, but the dominant pattern of the 1970s and 1980s was further
expansion of protections for criminal defendants. It is as if, after the late
1930s, the Roosevelt Court had not only left Lochner 0 intact but actually
used it to bar new kinds of government regulation.
Consider the bodies of criminal procedure doctrine that either did not exist
when Earl Warren retired or that were fairly trivial then but are both enormous
and important now: everything concerning jury selection-both the fair cross-
section doctrine?"' and the line of equal protection cases that govern
peremptory challenges2 2 -the doctrine of ineffective assistance of
205. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (Miranda violations); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (Fourth Amendment violations).
206. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
207. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984).
208. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680-83 (1985) (plurality opinion); id. at 685 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment).
209. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-95 (contrasting the newly discovered evidence standard with the
reasonable probability standard the Court adopted for ineffective assistance claims).
210. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
211. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
212. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), first made it possible to establish an equal protection
violation based solely on the government's use of peremptory challenges in the case at hand. See also
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying the Batson rule to gender-based strikes);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (applying the Batson rule to strikes by defense counsel); Powers
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counsel,2 13  virtually all the law related to guilty pleas, "i " the double
jeopardy doctrine governing successive use of criminal and civil penalties, '5
most of the Sixth Amendment law governing post-indictment or post-
arraignment police questioning,"6 the law governing the use of force by
police officers, 1 7 and the law governing arrest warrants and when police
have to get them.2 8 This list does not include the huge mass of law
regulating the imposition of capital punishment, all of which has come into
being since 1976.2'9 The conventional wisdom is that these developments
simply involved the fleshing out of (and often cutting back on) Warren Court
decisions, that criminal procedure doctrine has become more conservative, less
restrictive, even as the doctrine itself has grown. But most of the areas just
mentioned involve no judicial fleshing-out; they represent new departures,
constitutional regulation of things that were formerly not regulated.
Conservative and liberal Justices alike have led the march toward ever more
constitutional restriction of the criminal process. Indeed, the scope of criminal
procedure has probably expanded as much in the past two (conservative)
decades as it did in the more liberal 1960s.
In a society with lower crime rates, higher levels of funding for criminal
defense, and more restrictive criminal statutes, these various sorts of procedural
regulation would have seemed costlier, more of a hindrance to prosecutors and
the police. Changes in the ideological leanings of the judiciary might have
played a larger role in the law's development-as they have in a range of other
constitutional areas (think of the last two decades' Supreme Court decisions
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that the defendant need not be of the same race as the jurors struck
in order to make out a Batson claim).
213. Lower courts began to develop ineffective assistance docinne in the 1970s See. e g. United
States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) The Supreme Court defined the constitutional
law governing conflicts of interest in the 1970s and 1980s See Holloway v Arkansas. 435 U S 475
(1978); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Burger v Kemp. 483 U S 776 (1987) With respect to
the main body of ineffective assistance doctrine, the Court first entered the field in 1984 See Strickland,
466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U S 648 (1984)
214. Constitutional regulation of guilty pleas basically began with Bradi t United States. 397 U S
742 (1970), which expressly permitted some forms of plea bargaining and hence opened the door to
regulation of the bargaining process.
215. See Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S 767 (1994). United States v Halper. 490 U S 435 (1989)
216. Of course, Maasiah . United States, 377 U S 201 (1964). vhich established the Sixth
Amendment right to be free from certain forms of post-charging police questioning. was a Warren Court
decision. But Massiah was widely regarded as a dead letter alter Mtranda % Arizona. 384 U S 436(1966).
which established a Fifth Amendment nght to counsel in the police interrogation setting It was the Burger
Court that reinvigorated Massiah, giving it independent standing and developing an entire body ol doctrine
to define its bounds. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U S 625 (1986). Maine v Moulton. 474 U S 159
(1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), Brewer v Williams. 430 U S 387 (1977)
217. The seminal cases on the constitutional limits on deadly and nondeadly force were not decided
until 1985 and 1989, respectively. See Tennessee v Garner, 471 U S I (1985. Graham % Connor. 490
U.S. 386 (1989).
218. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U S 204 (1981). Payton v Nev, York, 445 U S 573 t1980)
219. The 1976 decisions from which all the law ot capital punishment is descended arc Roberts%
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woods, on North Carolina. 428 U S 280 (1976). Jurrk % Texai, 428
U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). and Gregg v Georgia. 428 U S 153 11976)
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on affinnative action, campaign finance, religious freedom, and school
desegregation). But the very existence of defendant-protective procedural
doctrine tends to push toward lower funding and broader substantive criminal
law. Together with the coincidence of higher crime rates, those forces make
procedures cheap and, relatively speaking, ideologically uncontentious. The
judicial right and left have continued to argue about the merits of particular
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rules, and there has been some significant
retreat from broad Warren Court protections in a few areas °.22  But to a
striking degree, argument about the enterprise of using constitutional law to
shape the criminal process has been absent.
Interestingly, in some pockets of cases judges have seen heavy costs from
constitutional regulation, and in those areas the Supreme Court has tended to
move to cabin the costs. Large-scale drug prosecutions involve defendants with
substantial resources; such cases also often raise plausible search and seizure
claims. Not coincidentally, the Court has, by and large, cooperated with
Congress in making forfeiture remedies effective in such cases, particularly
through the device of freezing assets that might otherwise be used to hire
expensive attorneys. 22' More broadly, the Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions have facilitated the use of informants and undercover agents in drug
cases, even while restrictions on some other kinds of police investigation have
grown.222
220. One area of retreat has been the law governing the scope of the exclusionary rule. See Carol S.
Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, 71vo Answers, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 2466 (1996) (noting that remedies have been restrained more than have substantive rights). Another
example is the law governing eyewitness identifications, where the Warren Court seemed to state a broadly
protective standard that was largely undone by the Burger Court. Compare Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967) (finding constitutional error in the admission of in-court identifications of the accused because
they may have been tainted by illegal line-up procedures), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed an accused the right to counsel at a post-indictment line-up),
with United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at a post-indictment photographic line-up), and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to pre-indictment identifications).
221. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v.
Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
222. The Court decided in 1971 that the use of undercover agents did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment "search," thereby facilitating stings and fake buys in drug investigations. See United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In 1983, the Court relaxed the standards by which informants' tips could
support a finding of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). This was particularly
important for enforcement of drug crime, as the large majority of search warrants that rest on informants'
tips are used in drug investigations. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 41 & tbl.2-12 (1985) (noting that, in seven cities studied,
drug cases ranged from 55% to 96% of those cases in which warrant applications relied on informants'
tips).
These developments obviously eased drug enforcement. Yet they were not part of a uniform pattern
in constitutional regulation of police investigation. In a number of areas constitutional regulation of the
police grew tougher after 1970. In police interrogation, for example, the Court revived Sixth Amendment
restrictions, see supra note 216, and both strengthened and extended the prohibition on post-invocation
police questioning, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that the invocation of the right
to counsel bars subsequent police-initiated questioning); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988)
(applying the Edwards ban to questioning about a different crime than the one for which the defendant was
arrested); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (holding that the Edwards ban continues to apply
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Similarly, capital murder defendants, though they often have poor-quality,
underpaid counsel at trial, also often have very high-quality volunteer
representation on habeas corpus. The result has been both a large volume of
habeas litigation in capital cases and strikingly high success rates for capital
defendants.223 The Court responded by moving to cut off habeas relief
through restrictive procedural default and retroactivity decisions, decisions that
applied to habeas generally but probably were designed with death penalty
litigation in mind. 4
But outside these and a few other categories, the Supreme Court in
particular and appellate courts in general do not see the costs of the procedural
regulation the Court has undertaken over the past generation. Because the costs
are unseen, because they take the form of cases not brought and claims not
made, the Court has kept adding to the regulation. That in turn only raises the
incentive for legislatures to limit resources and broaden criminal liability,
thereby hiding the law's effects even more. In this particular legal dialogue,
each side seems to encourage the worst in the other.
IV. A DIFFERENr CONSTITUTIONAL PATH: SUBSTANCE AND FUNDING
To this point I have tried to explain why, given the existing allocation of
power between courts and legislatures, our system suffers from a natural
tendency toward a series of pathologies-overregulation of the criminal
process, proceduralization of criminal litigation at the expense of the merits,
overcriminalization, and underfunding of criminal defense-and why these
pathologies tend to reinforce one another. I cannot establish precisely how
much this natural tendency has caused, for many forces have been at work in
the system, and there are a variety of causal stories one can tell about the
phenomena I have discussed above. The existence of the pathologies is fairly
clear. Their extent is not, and causal responsibility is guesswork.
after a suspect has met with his lawyer).
223. See Lay, supra note 148, at 1044 n 166
224. The Court moved to strengthen procedural default doctrine before death penalty litigatiton became
a significant problem. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U S 72 (1977) Still. Sike3 might have meant much
or little, and in the years since 1977 the Court has consistently choscn -much - The key decisions are. not
coincidentally, death penalty cases. See Coleman v. Thompson. 501 U S 722 (1991). Murria, % Giariatano.
492 U.S. 1 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)
The use of retroactivity doctrine as a vehicle for reining in habeas began with Teague t Lane. 489
U.S. 288 (1989). Teague was not a death penalty case, but most of the Supreme Court cases fleshing it out
have been. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), Sawyer v Smith. 497 U S 227 (1990). Sallke v
Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U S 407 (1990), Penry v Lynaugh. 492 U S 302
(1989). Other restrictions on habeas relief have likewise been crafted in capital murder cases See
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,489-97 (1991) (detailing abuse-ol-the-wnt doctrine) It is hard to avoid
the inference that the Court has seen habeas as a vehicle for policing what it sees as excessie capital
punishment litigation. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, I3 Innocence Sufficient 7 An Es.i on the U S Supreme
Court's Continuing Problemi with Federal Habeaa Corpu3 and the Death Penalty. 68 IND L J 817 (1993)
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Yet the broader trends of the past two decades, in both case law and
legislation, do seem to fit the dynamic outlined in preceding sections. We not
only have overbroad criminal liability; we have overbroad criminal liability
especially with respect to crimes of the well-off, and those crimes are
increasingly federal rather than state. And the scope of this liability has grown
over the past three decades as criminal procedure has grown. We not only have
a universe of criminal defendants that is disproportionately poor; the
disproportion appears to be worse than it was two decades ago-again, as
criminal procedure has grown. And though the point is necessarily
impressionistic, we seem not only to have criminal litigation that focuses
heavily on procedural/constitutional issues; that focus appears to have
intensified steadily during the time of criminal procedure's growing reach.
All this sounds like an argument for less constitutional regulation-perhaps
a lot less. Yet that is not the only message one can derive from the perverse
dynamic between courts and legislatures. On the contrary, there is an argument
here that constitutional law has been not too interventionist, but merely
interventionist in the wrong places. Consider the two main aspects of criminal
justice that constitutional law has left alone: the content of substantive criminal
law and the allocation of resources within the system.
Serious constitutional regulation of substantive criminal law, if it existed,
would have to take some combination of two forms. The first is a
proportionality rule, requiring that the conduct criminalized be serious enough
to justify the punishment attached to it. The second is an application of the
first: a kind of criminal substantive due process, ensuring that the conduct
criminalized was serious enough to justify some criminal punishment. The first
sort of doctrine (which the Supreme Court briefly, but only briefly,
embraced)2" would bar oversentencing. The second would bar overbroad
criminal liability. Both would bear directly on what one would think is the
most important question the system faces: whether the people being punished
deserve the punishment they receive.
Substantive constitutional regulation of this sort may be more workable
than one might think. A proportionality requirement need not mean appellate
review of every sentence. Courts might instead require that trial judges be
given the power to revise sentences downward, that legislative guidelines be
225. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (rejecting serious proportionality review); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (embracing it); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(apparently rejecting it again). In Harmelin, the Chief Justice and. Justice Scalia took the position that
proportionality review of noncapital sentences is never required. See id. at 990-94 (plurality opinion).
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter concluded that while proportionality review is sometimes required,
no comparison of sentences across crimes or across jurisdictions is necessary if the crime in question is
serious-in that event, any noncapital sentence is automatically proportionate. See id. at 1004-05 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and in the judgment). The same Justices also concluded that possession of a
significant amount of drugs was serious. See id. at 1006. The upshot is that proportionality review is now
unavailable for all major street crimes, for drug distribution, and for drug possession where the amount
possessed was substantial.
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construed to set ceilings for sentences but not floors. Just as the finder of fact
in a criminal case may acquit for any reason, notwithstanding the legislature's
definition of the offense, 226  perhaps the sentencer should have the
constitutionally guaranteed option of leniency, again without regard to
legislative instruction. (The parallels between the two are stronger than appears
at first blush.) This would involve a dramatic legal change in an increasingly
guidelines-dominated world where judicial discretion is receding. Yet dramatic
though it is, this sort of legal change is hardly unthinkable, or unadniinistrable.
After all, every American jurisdiction lived with broad sentencing discretion
until fairly recently.
227
Nor would constitutional limits on criminal law mean a wholesale judicial
rewriting of criminal codes; two more modest changes could accomplish a
great deal. First, courts could require proof of some level of culpability with
respect to criminality for especially broad regulatory offenses-a mail fraud
defendant charged with something well shy of traditional common law fraud
could be entitled to argue that he had no idea his conduct was criminal. A
limited ignorance-of-the-law defense along these lines would provide
substantial protection for defendants maneuvering through regulatory
minefields. More importantly, it would limit prosecutors' ability to use
overbroad statutes to force guilty pleas in questionable cases. The second
change is familiar in the literature,2  though the legal system has never
embraced it: Courts could forbid arrest or prosecution based on crimes that are
not regularly enforced (or, as with traffic offenses, not regularly treated as
crimes). 229 A constitutionalized desuetude doctrine would bar the strategic
226. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S 54 (1978)
227. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 4 (1996) ("In 1970. every state and the federal
system had an 'indeterminate sentencing system' in which judges had wide discretion to decide who went
to prison and to set maximum and sometimes minimum prison terms ")
228. The argument is most commonly associated with GUIDO CALABRF.s, A COMMON LAW ioR Tift-
AGE OF STATUTES (1982). For an earlier and much less developed version of the argument. see Alexander
M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Termn-Foreword" The Passive %irtues, 75 HARv L RE\' 40. 61-64
(1961).
229. This position would undo the decision m IInliren United States. 116 S Ct 1769 1996). in
which the Supreme Court held, in essence, that all "'crimes" are to be treated alike for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Whren permits the police to use traffic offenses in precisely the same way that the police used
old-style vagrancy and loitering law: as a grant of discretionary power to stop. question, and (in
jurisdictions that classify traffic offenses as crime) search and arrest suspects based on unanticulated
suspicion of other crimes, or worse, based on the officer's whim or prejudice The result is Fourth
Amendment doctrine that appears to limit traffic stops but in practice does not
What the limit should be is a separate question. There are serious arguments for the proposition that
the police need broad discretionary authority of the son that vagrancy and loitering law once gave
them-indeed, as Debra Livingston has shown, those arguments are at the heart of the current community
policing movement. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quiahtrv of Life in Public Placei
Courts, Cornunwities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM L REv 551 (1997) Ho,,ever much %%eight those
arguments carry, limits on police discretion ought not to depend on states' ability to identify traltic-type
regulations that serve to authorize police action that is undertaken for other reasons
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use of non-crime "crimes," as where a contestable sexual assault case leads to
a guilty plea to sodomy.230
Restrictions like these would raise the cost of prosecuting defendants
charged with marginal or questionable crimes (not rich defendants, as
constitutional criminal procedure does). They would thus tend to shift
prosecutorial resources away from such crimes-a good thing, if courts would
do a decent job of determining which crimes are questionable. To the extent
substantive regulation would encourage a particular kind of defense claim at
the expense of some other kinds of claims, the claim encouraged is closely tied
to innocence; it bears directly on whether the defendant can fairly be punished,
or punished to the relevant extent, for what he did. These allocative effects
seem a good deal more benign than the effects of heavy regulation of
procedure.
For a brief time in the 1960s, the law appeared ready to embrace this type
of constitutional regulation. In 1957, Lambert v. California231 invalidated a
law criminalizing nonregistration by felons; in its opinion the Supreme Court
seemed to state a broad notice principle.232 In 1962, Robinson v.
California233 struck down a law criminalizing drug addiction, in an opinion
that established the basis for a broad, constitutionally required voluntary-act
norm.2 34  Three years later, the Court's decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,235 which overturned a criminal conviction under the state's anti-
contraception statute, suggested that a broad range of private conduct might be
outside the scope of criminal law. And in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
void-for-vagueness cases struck down a series of loitering and vagrancy laws
that police had used as street-cleaning statutes. 6 These different strands
might all have come together to form a body of substantive due process
focused on criminal law, a set of constitutional limits that would prevent
legislatures from criminalizing ordinary conduct or from relying on unenforced
crimes as grants of discretionary power to law enforcers.
This possibility, the chance that constitutional regulation of criminal justice
would be primarily substantive rather than procedural, is largely ignored today
but must have seemed quite real to the legal community of thirty-five years
230. Both arguments are developed at more length in Stuntz, supra note 5, at 31-38.
231. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
232. See id. at 228 ("Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice.").
233. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
234. When Robinson was decided, it was widely seen as casting a shadow on a variety of criminal
drug statutes, including laws barring possession and use. See Michael R. Asimow, Comment, Constitutional
Law: Punislunent for Narcotic Addiction Held Cruel and Unusual, 51 CAL. L. REV. 219, 225-26 (1962);
The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REV. 54, 146 (1962).
235. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
236. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). For a good discussion of the
street-cleaning uses of such statutes, see Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-7ype Law and Its Administration, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 603 (1956).
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ago. By the early- to mid-1960s, it was quite clear that the criminal justice
system was being brought under constitutional control. But the nature of the
control was up for grabs. Cases such as Mapp and Gideon pointed one way,
Lambert and Robinson (and Griswold, a decision that has moved far afield
from criminal law in ways that were not necessarily obvious at the time)"'
the other. For a moment, a very different mix of procedure and substance
seemed in the offing.
The moment passed. Powell v. Texas 235 abandoned the broader reading
of Robinson, and today the criminalization of low-level addictive behavior is
routine. Inexplicably, Lambert's notice principle turns out not to matter.
Almost nothing in existing doctrine turns on it, and Congress continues to
criminalize a stunning array of conduct that its perpetrators would not likely
suspect is criminal. 239 Griswold took off, but in directions that were not at
all tied to criminal law.240 And while vagueness doctrine survives, the
overturning of vagrancy and loitering statutes has been all but undone: Traffic
"crimes" now play the role that those statutes used to play-they authorize the
police to stop and/or arrest whom they wish-albeit with a population in
vehicles rather than on foot. 241 While procedural regulation has continued to
grow, substantive regulation has shrunk.
The story is slightly different, but with much the same bottom line, when
it comes to the funding of criminal defense counsel. After Gideon v.
Wainwright, several years passed before the court system took seriously the
problem of nominal representation-provision of a lawyer who failed to do the
things good lawyers should do, either because of lack of time or because of
incompetence. When in the 1970s such claims began to flood the courts, the
universal judicial response was to define the issue in terms of the conduct of
defense counsel, not the resource structure created by the state."2 Hence the
237. Though it did not use the word "cnmminal," the Harvard Lm Rettel "s discussion of Grlm old
emphasized that decision's tension with the long history of cnminal regulation of morals See The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 103, 164-65 (1965). Alexander Bickel's famous commentary on
Griswold's predecessor, Poe v. Ullnan, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). stressed the virtues of requinng regular
enforcement of criminal prohibitions, partly as a means of checking prosecutonal power and partly in order
to force legislative reconsideration of outdated statutes See Bickel. 3upra note 22. at 63-64 These
arguments suggest ways in which Griswold might have h.id more to do with the scope of substantive
criminal law than with the scope of constitutionally protected privacy
238. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (sustaining the conviction of an alcoholic for being drunk in public)
239. See supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text
240. Though the early abortion cases dealt with criminal prohibitions. ee Roe v Wade. 410 U S 113.
117-19 (1973), those cases have consistently focused on privacy and reproductive autonomy. 5ee. e g.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-53 (1992). not on the sons of arguments that might have
led to a broader consideration of the limits of criminal liability
241. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). aupra note 229
242. For a good survey and analysis of the early ineffecive assistance cases. see Gary Goodpaster.
The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel tr Death Penaltn Camei, 58 N Y U L REv 299 (1983)
As Goodpaster notes, these cases divided along different tests concerning attorney pcrtormancc and
prejudice. See id. at 339-52.
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law of ineffective assistance of counsel focuses wholly on defects in counsel's
performance and the prejudice that results from those defects 43
If this constitutional regulation of defense counsel's performance had
worked, it would have regulated funding indirectly. Sixth Amendment law
would force counsel to perform to a given level, thereby forcing states to
spend whatever it took to permit counsel to perform to that level. But the
regime failed. No one has yet figured out a good mechanism for defining a
reasonable level of representation-more importantly, no one has figured out
a way to define a reasonable level of attorney investigation. The difficulty is
that some cases may call for almost no effort while others require a lot;
separating the categories is at least expensive, and at most impossible. The law
has responded by retreating to the model of the discrete attorney error.
Insufficient investigation is basically left alone. The upshot is that Gideon,
while not trivial, meanp vastly less than it seems. Defendants receive counsel,
but counsel must bear caseloads that require them to start with a strong
presumption against any significant investment in any given case.
As with constitutional regulation of criminal substance, it need not have
been this way. Instead of seizing on counsel's performance in the ineffective
assistance cases of the 1970s, courts might have sought to enforce minimum
levels of funding for public defenders' offices and minimum levels of pay (or
higher caps) for separately appointed counsel. The rationale for such
requirements seems obvious: Absent sufficient resources, counsel cannot
function as counsel; thus, Gideon requires some budgetary floors if it is to
fulfill its promise. Arguments of this sort have been explored, tentatively, by
a few state courts, but only recently.2" The exploration might easily have
come sooner and more aggressively.
Had it followed this path, the system would likely be substantially fairer,
in ways that are biased in favor of rather than against the poor. As with
substantive regulation, the perverse consequences that flow from an aggressive
constitutional law of criminal procedure would not necessarily follow from
constitutional funding requirements. Nor would funding requirements
automatically involve the courts in impossible managerial difficulties akin to
those that (on some accounts) have bedeviled litigation over school systems
and prisons. A requirement of adequate resources need not mean judicial
regulation of how those resources are allocated within public defenders'
offices. 245 No judicial micromanagement would be necessary. Unlike prison
243. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984).
244. See cases cited supra note 78.
245. One important caveat should be noted. Because public defenders are salaried, a rise in budgets
could leave caseloads unaffected if, for example, the added funds were spent on raises rather than on hiring
more attorneys (along with office space and staff to serve them). Something like this may have happened
over the course of the past generation: In her study of Chicago public defenders, Lisa McIntyre reports that
the once-enormous salary differential between prosecutors and public defenders had virtually disappeared
by the 1980s. See MCINTYRE, supra note 22, at 90-91. The greater the tendency to raise salaries rather than
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cases, testing compliance with judicial decrees would seem to be easy: Either
the required appropriations were made or they weren't. And unlike school
cases, courts would not need to worry that private parties could defeat
regulation, as parents defeated desegregation decrees by moving their children
to different districts or by placing them in private schools. Funding
requirements would be, as a practical matter, impossible to evade.'
In short, both substantive regulation and funding requirements would
directly address serious and common injustices, would be doctrinally plausible,
and would lack the kinds of perverse side effects that flow from extensive
regulation of criminal procedure. To be sure, a constitutional law of substance
and funding would itself require some limits on the criminal process in order
to avoid legislative evasion: Substantive limits and funding requirements are
of little value if the state need not prove the defendant guilty of anything. But
the provision of counsel, some sort of trial process, and a requirement of a
high standard of proof in contested cases should be enough. The kind of
criminal procedure doctrine that tilts the risk of error in the defendant's favor
would be necessary. The kind of doctrines that regulate everything from trial
management to street-level policing would not.
This point is important, for the relationship is not symmetrical. If extensive
limits on the criminal process are to work as intended, if they are not to
generate perverse side effects, they require serious constraints on legislative
definition of crimes and on legislative allocation of resources. Constitutional
criminal procedure is imperialist: It demands judicial control over the whole
to expand capacity, the more courts would be pressed to regulate not only overall funding levels but the
salary structures of public defenders' offices as well. At the same time. a workable bascline exists for that
second sort of regulation: It would be hard to justify the need to pay public defenders more than local
prosecutors.
246. This is a partial answer to Gerald Rosenberg's claim that judicial reform eforts of this sort are
essentially impossible to pull off. See ROSENBERG. aupra note 94. at 334-35 A milder version of the claim
is quite tight, and Rosenberg deserves a great deal of credit for making it Judge-dnven social and
institutional reforms tend strongly to have less real-world impact than one would suspect from reading the
cases; this follows from the fact that judicial orders must be filtered through a variety ol other institutions
and actors in order to reach the world on the ground At least within the cnminal justice system, judge-
made rules also tend to have different effects from those one would expect. tThis last pattern may extend
beyond criminal justice: For an insightful and well-documented argument that the Supreme Court's
desegregation decisions' chief direct effect was to empower segregationist politicians, who in turn
inadvertently helped civil tights leaders mobilize Northern public opinion in the 1960s. see Michael J
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, ad the Civil Right.% Movement. 80 VA L. REV 7 (t1994)) But beyond
these mild generalizations, the effects of legal change must depend on what legal change one ts talking
about. Some judicial directives are vastly easier to evade than others, some rules are more exposed than
others to nullification by official discretion. The example that drives Rosenberg's book. desegregation. is
tife with opportunities for evasion, both by officials and by private actors That is true to some degree of
criminal procedure as well, though for its own particular reasons Criminal procedure has had perverse
effects, not because that is a necessary pattern to consututional lawmaking, but because of the system's
allocation of authority between courts and legislatures and the incentives procedural rules created for
legislatures, prosecutors, and defense counsel. If that allocation of authority were altered-if. for example.
courts had greater control over funding-and if constitutional law paid more attention to substance and less
to procedure, one should not assume that comparable perverse effects would ltkely follow While limits on
substantive criminal law and funding of criminal defense would no doubt generate their own errors and
unintended consequences, they would not create the same perverse incentives as criminal procedure
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system. That is not true of a constitutional law of criminal substance, nor of
constitutional standards for paying appointed criminal defense counsel.
Constitutional law can regulate procedure effectively only by also regulating
everything else; it can regulate substance and funding and still leave most of
procedure alone.
Which leads to an obvious question: Why has constitutional law focused
so heavily on criminal procedure, and why has it so strenuously avoided
anything to do with substantive criminal law and the funding of defense
counsel? By the early 1970s the pattern was probably set, and from that point
on constitutional law's path may have been self-reinforcing: Procedure begat
more procedure, for reasons I have tried to explore above. Yet that path was
not from the first inevitable; powerful reasons counseled a different approach.
Why then the turn away from substance and toward process?
Part of the answer is historical. Constitutional criminal procedure has deep
roots; constitutional criminal substance and constitutional funding requirements
do not. There is something to this answer, but not much. The large majority
of the law of criminal procedure is of very recent creation; the field basically
did not exist until a few decades ago. It is hard to argue that our constitutional
roots require a regime that no one imagined until almost two centuries after the
Constitution was ratified, and one century after the Fourteenth Amendment
redefined the federal-state relationship. Another part of the answer has to do
with constitutional text: The Bill of Rights says a great deal about criminal
process and nothing about substantive criminal law or spending for defense
lawyers. This too is less of an explanation than first appears. The texts of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments do not dictate the large body of law that
exists in their name. We could have a very small and unobtrusive law of
criminal procedure-as we mostly did until a generation ago-with no violence
to the text. Proof of that proposition lies in the extreme rarity of textual
argument in this area.247
Meanwhile, substantive criminal law could be constrained quite easily
under the authority of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. The
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments could plausibly be read to imply
a proportionality principle for sentencing, capital and noncapital alike. And, in
Lambert, due process already has been read to require notice, which in turn
suggests that criminalizing conduct in which ordinary people might innocently
engage should be impermissible. 28 As for funding, a decent level of
resources for criminal defense counsel is a natural extrapolation from the Sixth
Amendment's requirement to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. None of
these arguments requires a huge stretch in terms of text or structure. They
247. Akhil Amar's work is a notable exception to this tendency. See AMAR, supra note 1; Akhil Recd
Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807 (1997).
248. See supra notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
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perhaps require abandoning original intent as a baseline, but that bridge has
already been crossed: No one thinks current Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment law is faithful to the Framers' wishes. In short, neither the
Constitution nor history bars a very different relationship between
constitutional law and criminal justice than the one we now see.
The real difficulty with regulating substantive criminal law and funding
decisions may be more basic. There is no nonarbitrary way to arrive at the
proper legal rules, no way to get to sensible bottom lines by something that
looks and feels like legal analysis. Whether proportionality review is lodged
in appellate or trial courts, the only way to do it is to do it, to decide that this
sentence is too great but not that one. There is no metric for determining right
answers, no set of analytic tools that defines what a given sentence ought to
be. That, after all, was the problem with discretionary sentencing regimes, the
problem that produced the current infatuation with guidelines. Similarly,
heightened mens rea requirements for overbroad crimes beg the question of
which crimes are overbroad. Special culpability rules for, say, mail fraud
would inevitably rest on a judicial judgment that mail fraud is badly defined,
that Congress criminalized more than it should have. Desuetude appears
simpler, as it requires only that courts determine whether a given offense is
regularly enforced. But regular enforcement is both hard to define and hard to
determine; judges would likely retreat to asking whether they would have
expected this behavior to be treated as a crime. All this amounts not just to
open-ended judicial regulation-constitutional law has a lot of that, and courts
do not seem terribly bothered by it-but also to arbitrary judicial regulation,
regulation that produces outcomes untethered to any definable legal principle.
This unanchored quality is precisely what defeated serious proportionality
review of long prison terms,249 and why, this past year, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that traffic "crimes" do not count for purposes of
authorizing some kinds of searches and arrests. 25 Perhaps it is also why
Lambert has had so little doctrinal impact.
Similarly, the only way to set funding floors is to set them-to say, states
must spend this much on criminal defense, but need not spend more. There is
no analytic structure that allows one to specify the right dollar amount. --
(Note the contrast with contemporary state cases about equalization of school
funding, where some measure of equality across districts provides a workable
baseline.) 2 A good deal of constitutional law may consist of judicial policy
249. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S 957, 985-90 (1991) (plurality opinion), id at 998-1001
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concumng in the judgment)
250. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769. 1774-77 (1996)
251. And note that the right dollar amount will differ from place to place, depending on (among other
things) the mix of crimes in the relevant jurisdiction.
252. For a good survey of these cases, see Peter Enrich. Leaving Equalhty Behind Neu Directions in
School Finance Reform. 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995). Enrich notes that funding disparities have proved
remarkably persistent, even in jurisdictions where courts have intervened to equahzc the disparities See
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preferences with a thin legal veneer, but here the veneer seems transparent.
That simple point may be the source of much of constitutional law's
troubled relationship with criminal justice. Constitutional law has focused
relentlessly on the sorts of issues that are susceptible to legal analysis-how
to select juries, when to require warrants, which mistrials permit retrial and
which ones mean the defendant must go free. These are classic lawyers' issues;
they give rise to classic lawyers' arguments. But courts' decisions on those
issues are embedded in a system shaped by more open-ended-and more
flagrantly political-judgments: How bad should something be before we call
it a crime? How much money should we spend on criminal defense? Perhaps
courts would do a sufficiently poor job of making these open-ended political
judgments that we are better off leaving them to other actors. That is the
system's current premise, and the premise is entirely plausible. But if that
premise is right, those other actors-chiefly legislators and prosecutors-are
able to defeat courts' work on courts' own turf: All those judge-made
procedural rules are likely not to work the way they are supposed to. In the
criminal justice system's three-legged stool-procedure, substance, and
money-procedure is the least stable leg, the one that most depends on the
others for support.
So criminal procedure may be no more than an instance of courts properly
recognizing the need to intervene in a system that imposes terrible costs on
large numbers of people, and then doing what comes naturally, regulating the
kinds of things courts are used to regulating. That includes avoiding a kind of
decisionmaking that, for courts, seems unnatural. All of which might be fine
if the judicially regulated sphere could be isolated from the rest of the system.
Sadly, it cannot.
V. CONCLUSION
It is hard to know what to make of the law of criminal procedure. It
plainly prevents some serious wrongs: Supposed murderers who refuse to
admit guilt cannot be executed without trials at which they have lawyers and
juries that find them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; supposed rapists cannot
be sent to prison for decades based on confessions that the police beat out of
them; a black suspect in the robbery of a white store clerk cannot be sent to
prison by the verdict of a jury from which all blacks were struck. These are
very important benefits.
There are other benefits too, ones I have not discussed here. Criminal
procedure shapes the behavior of regulated actors in some productive ways:
id. at 102-03. That hardly seems surprising, given the problems in implementing judicially mandated
funding orders. Voters in local elections and parents deciding where to live and whether to enroll their
children in private school can go far toward defeating most judicial orders. This kind of evasion is harder
to imagine for funding requirements for criminal defense.
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Police officers are somewhat less likely to ransack someone's home on a whim
than they would be in a system that left police investigation to local regulation.
Here as elsewhere, legal prohibitions tend to deter the prohibited conduct
(though deterrence is undermined by prosecutors' ability to select among
strong cases, and by defense counsel's inability to raise all plausible claims).
Where the prohibitions are sensible, that counts as a social gain. I have
avoided discussing these benefits not because they are unreal or trivial, but
because they are familiar.
Yet there are substantial tradeoffs, and the tradeoffs are not so familiar.
The criminal process is much harder to control than courts suppose; it is driven
by forces the courts do not, and perhaps cannot, direct. When courts do act,
their actions are shaped by those forces in ways the courts themselves may not
understand, ways that are at best ambiguous and at worst bad. Some part of
what the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments protect has probably come at
the cost of a criminal justice system that is less focused on the merits and
hence more likely to convict innocents, a system that disproportionately targets
the poor, and a system that convicts for "crimes" that cover vastly more than
anyone would wish to punish. The merits of this bargain are at least open to
question.
Does that mean constitutional criminal procedure should be scrapped? No:
Limits on police violence are essential to a free society, just as Gideon and the
reasonable doubt rule are essential to any adversarial system that takes
accuracy seriously. Now ask the question differently: Should the law of
criminal procedure be scaled back, perhaps dramatically? Maybe so-not
because it is wrong in principle, but because it is at odds with the system in
which it operates. Where the scaling back should come and how substantial it
should be depend, of course, on piecework evaluation, of both the norms on
which particular bodies of law rest and the consequences they generate. But
that evaluation should begin with a sense of the limits of the enterprise, the
difficulty of doing what criminal procedure seeks to do without also doing
other, much worse things.
Curiously, this kind of doctrine-by-doctrine assessment has never really
happened. Debate about consequences in the literature on criminal procedure
has been thin, to say the least.2 3 And that thinness has corrupted the debate
253. The literature on Miranda is a striking example Police interrogation is generally thought to be
a terribly important feature of the criminal process, and Miranda marked a sharp change in the law's
treatment of police interrogation. But as Paul Cassell has noted, until the past couple of years neither courts
nor academics paid any attention at all to Miranda's effects. simply assuming that the case did not matter
much. Recent work by Cassell, Richard Leo, and Stephen Schulholer has done a great deal to remedy this
inattention. In addition to sources cited 3upra note 160. sec Stephen J Schulhofer. Mitanda5s Practical
Effect: Substantial Benefit3 and Vazishingiy Small Social Cot. 90 Nw U L Rt.v 500 (1996)
Of course, one can always complain about the lack of attention to empics. that gripe is hardly
unique to this field. The inattention to consequences in criminal procedure goes deeper Conscquenttalist
theory has been as thin as empirical testing. The upshot is an inadequate sense of the likely clfects o1
doctrinal variation at the margin
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about norms. For the past thirty-five years, the legal system's discussion of
criminal defendants' rights has suffered from an air of unreality, a sense that
all goals can be satisfied and all values honored-that we can, for example,
have the jury selection process we want at no cost to anything else we might
want. A sense of rank ordering, of assigning priority to some constitutional
norms rather than treating all as equally deserving of regulatory attention, is
absent.
That should change. It is time to acknowledge the tradeoffs, to take
seriously the nature of the system the law of criminal procedure regulates and
the ways in which that system can evade or undermine the regulation. In a
regime like ours, countermajoritarian restraints on the criminal process can
succeed only at a cost, the cost is probably substantial, and it is
disproportionately imposed ori those who least deserve to bear it. Leaving more
of the process to majoritarian institutions might be better, not least for some
of the defendants the process is designed to protect.
That need not mean leaving defendants to the mercies of state legislatures
and local prosecutors. If constitutional law's response to criminal justice has
failed, it has failed not just from too much intervention but from too little as
well. Making Gideon a formal right only, without any ancillary funding
requirements, has produced a criminal process that is, for poor defendants, a
scandal. Courts' reluctance to police legislatures' criminalization and
sentencing decisions-coupled with the way those legislative decisions can be
used in a system that gives prosecutors blanket authority to choose whom to
go after and for what-has produced its own scandals. Defendants' interests
might best be protected by less procedure, coupled with a much more activist
judicial posture toward funding, the definition of crime, and sentencing-all
areas where judges have been loath to take dramatic stands.
This judicial reticence seems to have been motivated by a desire not to
trench on the prerogatives of the politicians, a desire to stick to the more law-
like and presumably less contentious ground of process. That the 1960s
produced a revolution in criminal procedure may testify to the underrated
conservatism of Warren Court constitutional thought, to that radical Court's
willingness to confine its intervention to conventional categories. 4 If so, in
this area these conservative instincts may have been misplaced-as, perhaps,
was the Court's reformist (procedural) zeal. The system might be better off
today had Warren and his colleagues worried less about criminal procedure,
and more about criminal justice.
254. For an insightful commentary on the conservatism of the Warren Court, see Louis Michael
Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 Sup. CT. REv.
67, 70-71, 86-96, 120-21.
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